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REASSESSING THE TRADE-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: THE PARADIGM 
SHIFT IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONALISM 
PASHA L. HSIEH* 
Abstract 
This article reassesses the trade-development nexus in international economic law and provides 
the first examination of the approach to realize the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
through regional integration.  It argues that the emerging New Regional Economic Order in the 
multi-polar system will fortify the coalition of the developing countries in structuring the 
legalization of pro-development trade policy.  For decades, the misconceived concept of special 
and differential treatment has ignored the reality of the North-South Grand Bargain and 
disconnected the World Trade Organization from its development objectives.  The development 
crisis of the Doha Round requires a feasible “Plan B” for the Global South. 
By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, the article opens an inquiry into the 
assertive role of developing countries that prompted the paradigm shift in Asia-Pacific 
regionalism.  The realist and dependency theories are utilized to decipher the geopolitical 
complexity of the rapidly evolving South-South free trade agreements.  As a timely case study, the 
analysis is based on the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic 
Community and its implications for economic powers such as the United States and China.  It 
provides an account of the bloc’s services trade-oriented development policy under the balance of 
power strategy.  Finally, the article offers regulatory reform proposals on how to integrate 
development assistance and remove trade barriers.  Transnational legal harmonization and 
human rights protection in line with international labor principles are also indispensable.  Such 
reforms will strengthen the best practices for global regionalism and reinvigorate the trade-
development connection in the multilateral trading system. 
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I. Introduction 
The convergence of economic liberalization and development policy has formed the 
cornerstone of multilateral trade negotiations and international economic law for decades.  
Geopolitical challenges remain when it comes to reconciling the mercantilist concept of enhancing 
market access with the principle of redistributive justice that demands preferential treatment.1  
More fundamentally, the legalization of the trade-development nexus reflects the global North-
                                                          
1 For mercantilist and distributive justice concepts in international trade, see J. Michael Finger, The Uruguay Round 
North-South Bargain: Will the WTO Get over It? in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS 
IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 301, 303-05 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds. 2002); Chantal 
Thomas, The Death of Doha? Forensics of Democratic Governance, Distributive Justice, and Development, in 
GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS 185, 185-205 (Chi Carmody 
et al. eds. 2014). 
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South conflicts that underpin divergent national interests between developed and developing 
countries.2 
Unanimously adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development seeks to transform such long-standing conflicts to cooperation.3  With the aim to 
eradicate poverty and reinforce inclusive economic growth, the new Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) perceive international trade as the essential development apparatus.4  The SDGs 
mandate the revitalization of development by completing the negotiations of the Doha Round of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 5   Yet, states’ irreconcilable stances on liberalizing 
restrictions on agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and services trade led the 
Doha Round talks to an unresolved standstill.6  From Seattle to Nairobi, the WTO Ministerial 
Conferences have generated more frustrations than achievements.7 
The fate of the Doha Round hinges on whether it can achieve the aspirational commitment to 
development in tandem with liberalizing trade under the WTO and free trade agreements (FTAs).8  
                                                          
2 See Deniz Altınbaş, South-South Cooperation: A Counter-Hegemonic Movement? in THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL 
SOUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL, GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 29, 29 fn 1 (Justin Dargin ed. 
2013) (explaining the North-South divide in global politics). 
3 UN Adopts New Global Goals, Charting Sustainable Development for People and Planet by 2030, Sept. 25, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51968#.VkLue7crLrc.  The Sustainable Development Goals that 
took effect January 1, 2016 were built upon Millennium Development Goals that governed the development agenda 
from 2000 to 2015.  Draft Outcome Document of the United Nations Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2105 
Development Agenda, A/69/L.85, Aug. 12, 2015, at 3-7. 
4 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goals 1 & 8. 
5 Id. Goal 17. 
6 Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 573. 577-83 (2010); 
LDC Group Outlines Priorities ahead of WTO MC10, Oct. 20, 2015, http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-
africa/news/ldc-group-outlines-priorities-ahead-of-wto-mc10. 
7 For the implications of the trade-development disconnect in the Doha Round, see Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of 
Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 246-61 (2006); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, WTO Winners and Losers: The Trade and 
Development Disconnect, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 165, 168-77 (2007; Stalemate Continues at WTO Meet in Nairobi, HINDU, 
Dec. 20, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/stalemate-continues-at-wto-meet-in-
nairobi/article8005357.ece.  
8 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, Nov. 2001, paras. 1-6. 
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To understand the role of trade politics in shaping today’s global economic governance, it is pivotal 
to trace back to the origin of the North-South clash in the UN and the WTO.  The WTO’s 
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Bretton Woods 
institutions emerged as the integral framework that governs postwar economic order.9  The most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment of the GATT crystalized the guiding 
principles for legalism of trade rule-making. 10   Developing countries’ demands that their 
development needs be met by making exceptions to the West-dominated mechanism were 
predominantly ignored in the 1940s.11 
The South decided to shift the battle to the UN.  The proliferation of newly independent states 
in the post-colonial era bolstered developing countries’ political power to divert the GATT’s 
attention to “special and differential treatment” (SDT) for the South.12  The culmination of the 
movement was the 1974 UN declaration calling for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO).13   The NIEO principles combine the Westphalian concept and affirmative action in 
international economic law.14  On one hand, the South asked for recognition of its sovereignty over 
trade policy; on the other hand, it requested an increase in financial and technological assistance 
from the North.15 
                                                          
9 Bretton Woods Institutions refer to monetary institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.  
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1994), arts. I & III. 
11 See e.g., Nicholas Lamp, The “Development” Discourse in International Trade Lawmaking, Queen’s University 
Faculty of Law Research Paper Series, No. 2015-057 (2015), at 8-10 (indicating the US negotiators’ negative 
perception of “development” in the 1940s). 
12  Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When, and How? in 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 147, 148-49 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. 
Hoekman eds. 2006). 
13 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), A/RES/S-6/3201, May 1, 1974. 
14 See id. art. 4 (stressing the countries’ “full permanent sovereignty”); ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 101-02 (1987) (explaining developing countries’ request to rectify global economic 
inequalities and their emphasis on equality). 
15 Declaration on the Establishment of a NIEO, supra note 13, art. 4. 
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The NIEO soon failed because of the unified trans-Atlantic alliance vis-à-vis the erosion of the 
South’s political solidarity due to the disparate economic developments and the debt crisis.16  The 
rising Washington Consensus that imposed neoliberal liberalization reform as a prerequisite for 
aid assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions further weakened the NIEO’s momentum.17  
Arguably, the legacy of the NIEO resulted in the subsequent codification of SDT provisions during 
the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds.18  To “pay back” the developing countries for their sacrifice under 
the WTO’s single undertaking modality, the current Doha Development Agenda committed to 
making SDT “precise, effective and operational.” 19   Nonetheless, the realpolitik of WTO 
negotiations has rendered this promise unpromising. 
Contrary to the South’s expectations, the 148 current SDT provisions of the WTO agreements 
contain predominantly “best endeavor” language and are rarely enforced as binding obligations in 
WTO disputes. 20   The perceived failure to meet the development commitments inevitably 
undermines the legitimacy of the WTO and the implementation of the SDGs.  To some extent, 
such failure is due to developing countries’ erroneous presumption of the trade-development nexus.  
In essence, the policy space created under SDT arrangements hinders their meaningful 
participation in multilateral trade negotiations. 21   Without the “Grand Bargain” negotiations 
                                                          
16 Nils Gilman, The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction, 6:1 HUMANITY 1, 8 (2015); Trade and 
Development Report (2014), at 67-68. 
17 SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51 (2012); Chantal Thomas & Joel P 
Trachtman, Editors’ Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 1, 9 (Chantal Thomas & 
Joel P Trachtman eds. 2009). 
18 Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149-152; ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 72. 
19 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, para. 44. 
20 Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, TN/CTD/W/33, June 8, 2010, at 
3-5; Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment Provision under the WTO Agreements, in 
WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12, 14-30 (George A. Bermann & Petro C. Mavroidis eds. 2007). 
21 Michael Trebilcock, Between Theories of Trade and Development: The Future of the World Trading System, 
University of Toronto Law Working Paper Series No. 2014-10 (2014), at 3; Paul Collier, Why the WTO is Deadlocked: 
And What Can Be Done about It? 29:10 WORLD ECO. 1423, 1434 (2006). 
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between the North and South, the restricted trade gains simply nullify the economic goal of pro-
poor development and the human rights-oriented “right to development.”22 
Facing the global development crisis of the Doha Round and international economic law, this 
article provides the first examination of how the SDGs can be achieved through regional 
integration.  It argues that the emerging New Regional Economic Order (NREO) in multi-polar 
governance will strengthen the ability of the coalition of developing countries to reinforce the 
legalization of trade-development policy. 23   The article thus shifts the conventional trade-
development debate centered on the WTO’s SDT to a related but new dimension – the 
development role of the South in the age of global regionalism.  Distinct from the NIEO, the NREO 
derived from the power shifts to the Asia-Pacific does not aspire to challenge the normative 
foundation of WTO principles.  Rather, it opens an inquiry into how developing countries utilize 
the assertive balance of power strategy to alter the embedded hub-and-spoke architecture for 
development purposes.24 
Geopolitical changes have propelled the paradigm shift in international economic law.  First, 
the NREO aligns with the global movement from the US-centric “unipolar moment” to multi-polar 
trade governance.25  America’s hegemonic economic power has declined.  Asia’s emerging powers, 
                                                          
22 See Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for Future Negotiations, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 285, 285-89 (Daniel 
L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds. 2002) (illustrating the “Grand Bargain” negotiations); Declaration on the 
Right to Development, A/RES/41/128, Dec. 4, 1986, arts. 2-3 (mandating the duty to formulate development policies). 
23 Some authors used the term, “New Regional Economic Order.”  Nevertheless, none of them substantiate the claim 
or explain the nexus between development dimensions and contemporary Asia-Pacific regionalism.  E.g., Adriano R. 
Garcia, Toward a New Regional Economic Order in Asian and the Pacific, X:1-b J. PHIL. DEV. 45, 45-53 (1983); Greg 
Fry, “Pooled Regional Governance” in the Island Pacific: Lessons from History, in PACIFIC ISLANDS REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION AND GOVERNANCE 89, 92 (Satish Chand ed. 2005); KUNIKO ASHIZAWA, JAPAN, THE US, AND REGIONAL 
INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THE NEW ASIA: WHEN IDENTITY MATTERS 66 (2013). 
24 See Richard Baldwin, Preferential Trading Arrangements, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 632, 640 (Amrita Narlikar et al. eds. 2012) (discussing regionalism and hub-and-spoke bilateralism). 
25 For the unipolar and multi-polar political analyses, see generally Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 
FOREIGN AFF. 23 (1990-91); William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structure Realignment and 
Substantive Pluralism, 56:1 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2015).  For recent changes to international investment law in the Asia-
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including China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have galvanized the 
United States’ new agenda on its “Pacific Century.”26  The inking of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) in 2015 forms an indispensable part of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” 
strategy.27 
Second, compared with the economic slowdown in the United States and European Union (EU), 
the evolution of South-South trade cooperation in Asia has ascended to a new level and 
strengthened the multi-polar moment in the international economic order.  The ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are the most 
ambitious initiatives currently launched by developing countries.  As innovative models for South-
South FTAs, the AEC and the RCEP incorporate major Asia-Pacific powers and half of the world’s 
population.28  These blocs consolidate currently fragmented FTAs in Asia-Pacific regionalism.  
Lastly, regional developing countries, including least developed countries (LDCs), have engaged 
in the Grand Bargain expediting the shift from the import substitution policy to the export-oriented 
growth model.  Regardless of different national strategies, the NREO’s pro-development 
                                                          
Pacific, see Julien Chasse, The Shifting Tectonics of International Investment Law – Structure and Dynamics of Rule 
and Arbitration on Foreign Investment in the Asia-Pacific Region, 47:3 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. REV. 563 (2015). 
26 Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, 189 FOREIGN POLICY 56, 60-61 (2011). 
27 The 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was finalized in October 2015.  Id. at 62; Jane Perlez, U.S. Allies 
See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html?_r=0; David 
Nakamura, Obama Turns on Personal Appeal while Trying to Bolster His Pivot to Asia, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-tries-to-land-his-pivot-to-asia/2015/11/20/e2222e62-8e8b-11e5-
ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html. 
28 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) expects to consolidate the existing five free trade 
agreements (FTAs) that Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) concluded with China, Korea, Japan, India, 
Australia and New Zealand.  The ASEAN Community, including the AEAN Economic Community (AEC), was 
established in 2015 and the RCEP will be concluded in 2016.  Shujiro Urata, Constructing and Multilateralizing the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Asian Perspective, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 449 (2013), 
at 3-13; 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Community (2015) [Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration (2015)]; Joint Statement on the RCEP Negotiations, Nov. 2, 2015.  
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liberalization has prompted an emerging realization among the developing countries that they 
should transform from the North-South conflicts to collaboration in line with the SDGs. 
Built upon Jagdish Bhagwati’s commentary on First and Second Regionalism in the WTO 
context, this article answers the question of the trade-development paradigm in Third Regionalism 
with both theoretical and substantive claims.29  Theoretically, I will apply realist and dependency 
theories to decipher the NREO and advance the understanding of South-South FTAs, which the 
existing literature barely examines.  While realism addresses the transition from the pessimistic 
political rivalry to cooperation based on mutual interests, the new dependency theory sheds light 
on the economic transformation of neo-colonial states.30 
Substantively, I will focus on the legal framework of ASEAN’s trade liberalization as a timely 
case study for the NREO.  As part of the Global South, Southeast Asia has become a political hot 
spot due to the South China Sea disputes and Myanmar’s democratization.31  The proliferation of 
FTAs is also integral to this geopolitical configuration.  From the development perspective, the 
liberalization of services trade significantly reduces poverty and helps avoid the “middle income 
trap.”32  However, it is politically challenging to liberalize trade in services in the WTO and FTA 
arenas because of the behind-the-border barriers.  This research demonstrates how ASEAN states 
have incrementally liberalized the service sector for development goals on the basis of the 
                                                          
29 Bhagwati explains the first two waves of regionalism beginning in the 1960s and 1980s, respectively.  Jagdish 
Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15 WORD ECO. 535, 538-42 (1992).  I propose that “Third Regionalism” 
from the 2000s to the present reflects the rapid development of Asia-Pacific regionalism, including the emergence of 
mega FTAs. 
30 See generally Charles L. Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, 19:3 INT’L SECURITY 50, 50-53 
(1990); Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60:2 AM. ECO. REV. 231, 231-33 (1970). 
31 The South China Sea disputes are not only between ASEAN claimant states and China, but also involve conflicting 
national interests between the United States and China.  E.g., James R. Holmes, China’s Monroe Doctrine, Diplomat, 
June 22, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/chinas-monroe-doctrine/.  Aung San Suu Kyi’s party recently won the 
presidential election in Myanmar.  Jonah Fisher, Myanmar Election: Suu Kyi’s NLD Wins Landslide Victory, BBC, 
Nov. 13, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34805806.  
32 ASEAN Integration Monitoring Report (2013), at 93; ASEAN Services Integration Report (2015), at 1-2. 
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“interlocked mechanism” between internal and external region-based FTAs.33  As part of the 
South-South approach to implement the SDGs, the ASEAN experience provides developing 
countries a feasible “Plan B” by which to fortify the trade-development connection amid the Doha 
Round impasse. 
The article proceeds as follows.  After this introduction, Part II provides the historical and 
geopolitical context of North-South conflicts and trade-development debates in international 
economic law.  It reassesses the misconception of SDT that led to the disconnect between the Doha 
Round negotiations and the SDGs.  Based on the corollaries of realist and decency theories, it 
argues that the NREO, which emerged in the context of Third Regionalism, revitalizes pro-
development trade liberalization for developing countries.  Part III substantiates the paradigm shift 
by analyzing new trends among South-South FTAs in Asia-Pacific regionalism and focusing on 
the creation of the AEC as a key case study.  It explains the evolution of ASEAN’s legal structure 
that galvanizes regional economic integration across diverse countries and examines the rationale 
for the services trade-oriented policy as a development model. 
Part IV details the first efforts to provide a roadmap for realizing the SDGs through the 
legalization of trade-development policy in regional integration and highlights regulatory reform 
proposals for the post-2015 agenda.  To utilize the assertive balance of power strategy, ASEAN 
FTAs should operationalize multilateral development assistance and remove domestic barriers to 
services trade.  Essential actions also include the transnational legal harmonization on mutual 
recognition and immigration regulations and the legalization of human rights that incorporate 
international labor principles.  Finally, the conclusion draws together these theoretical and 
                                                          
33 In my view, the “interlocked mechanism” refers to how the liberalization effects of ASEAN’s internal and external 
FTAs (ASEAN+1 FTAs) are mutually reinforcing.  
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substantive arguments and offers legal and policy advice for reinvigorating the trade-development 
nexus at the global stage. 
II. The Theoretical Framework for the Trade-Development Nexus 
The trade-development nexus has been acutely contested since the inception of the Bretton 
Woods system.  This issue remains at the core of multilateral trade negotiations and implicates the 
fundamental differences in national interests between developed and developing countries.  Before 
proceeding to the analysis of present challenges to global regionalism, it is vital to establish the 
theoretical framework for the trade-development debates in the context of North-South conflicts 
in international economic law.  This article does so by reassessing the transformative concept of 
development in multi-polar trade governance. 
A. Unrealistic Promises in the Multilateral Trading System 
The SDGs established the post-2015 UN targets for development on the basis of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  The SDGs’ mandate to implement development goals 
through the Doha Round underscores the status of the WTO in the global development agenda.34  
However, the meaning and implementation of development in the WTO have been controversial, 
as it does not intend to be a development organization.  The concept of development in the WTO 
discourse is often confined to special and differential treatment.  Politically oriented SDT measures 
constitute an excuse for non-compliance with WTO principles and contravene the mercantilist 
premise of trade liberalization. 
1. The Misconceived Concept of Special and Differential Treatment 
                                                          
34 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goal 17. 
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The misconceived notion of SDT has led to unrealistic development promises in multilateral 
trade negotiations.  Structuring a sustainable trade-development nexus requires a holistic 
understanding of development in the historical and geopolitical context.  In contrast with the 
quantitative concept of trade, the multifaceted definition of development has been a subject of rife 
debate.  Various postwar theorists understood development as industrialization, modernization, or 
economic growth. 35   Since the 1980s, the human rights approach to development has been 
gathering momentum.36 
Following the universal movement for the “right to development” and “sustainable 
development,” Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom laid the new groundwork 
for development.37  Sen’s capability approach explains development as progress for removing 
“unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned 
agency.”38  This perception expanded the prevailing view of development from the parochial 
definition of economic performance such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to multiple 
factors that influence development.39  Sen’s theoretical framework contributed to the creation of 
measurable development parameters in the UN Human Development Index and the MDGs.40 
                                                          
35 See JAN NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, DEVELOPMENT THEORY: DECONSTRUCTIONS/RECONSTRUCTIONS 5-8 (2d ed. 2010) 
(detailing theories and meanings of development from the 1800s to 2000). 
36 Paul J. Nelson, At the Nexus of Human Rights and Development: New Methods and Strategies of Global NGOs, 31: 
12 WORLD DEV. 2013, 2014-15 (2003); ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 25-26. 
37 See generally Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 22; Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development: Our Common Future (1987); Human Rights Approaches to Sustainable Development, 
NGLS Roundup 90 (2002), at 1-2; AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
38 SEN, supra note 37, at xii.  
39 See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6:2 J. HUMAN DEV. 151, 153-54 (2005) (discussing the capability 
approach); Faizel Ismail, Mainstreaming Economic Development in the Trading System, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
& MULTILATERAL TRADING COOPERATION 213, 214 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds. 2016) (explaining 
Sen’s definition of development). 
40 The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development, Human Development Report (2010), at 16-28. 
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To eliminate what Sen called “unfreedoms,” the trade-development linkage concerns the 
implementation of development through international trade that maximizes economic growth and 
reduces poverty.  From a broader perspective, the urge for development in the multilateral trading 
system seeks to compromise the North-South conflicts in international economic law.  SDT 
provisions that accord developing countries proportional equality represent the political 
compromise on such conflicts.  In the GATT era, the creation of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) symbolized the collective power of the South in shaping 
trade norms dominated by developed nations.41  With the support of the developing countries 
known as the “Group of 77” (G77), Raúl Prebisch, the UNCTAD’s secretary general, pushed for 
the NIEO movement that demanded a “just and equitable” economic order.42 
In essence, the South demanded absolute sovereignty and requested justified exceptions to 
principal trade norms, including the MFN principle.  The UNCTAD did contribute to the 
enactment of “Part IV: Trade and Development” of the GATT in 1965.43  As a paramount SDT 
doctrine, the non-reciprocity principle requires developed countries not to “expect reciprocity for 
commitments made by them” in trade negotiations with less developed countries.44  The other 
landmark decision to codify SDT rights was the GATT’s adoption of the 1979 Enabling Clause 
that provided for preferential market access.45  This decision permanently authorized members to 
                                                          
41  See A Brief History of UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/About%20UNCTAD/A-Brief-History-of-
UNCTAD.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) (“The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) was held in Geneva in 1964”). 
42 Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149; Gilman, supra note 16, at 3-5; Declaration on the Establishment of a NIEO, 
supra note 13, arts. 4(j) & 5. 
43 Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149; ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 70. 
44 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1994), art. XXXVI:8. 
45 Differential and More Favorable Treatment of Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT 
Doc. L/4903, Nov. 28, 1979 [Enabling Clause].  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contracting parties 
of the adopted the permanent Enabling Clause after the 1971 decision that granted a ten-year waiver allowing 
generalized system of preferences (GSP) to depart from GATT norms.  Generalized System of Preferences, Decision 
of 25 June 1971, L/3545, June 28, 1971. 
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grant developing countries preferential treatment under the generalized system of preferences 
(GSP) schemes.46 
Notwithstanding the UNCTAD achievements in advancing the agenda of the South, the NIEO 
movement waned as a result of the G77’s diverging economic interests and the Thatcher-Reagan 
alliance’s refusal to accede to the NIEO demands.47   The NIEO gave way to the neoliberal 
Washington Consensus that imposed free market reform on developing countries.48  The Uruguay 
Round, which established the WTO, sharply diverted from previous negotiations by adopting the 
“take it or leave it” modality, known as the single undertaking approach.  Absent bargaining power, 
developing countries were compelled under multiple WTO agreements to assume daunting 
obligations in various areas ranging from services to intellectual property.  The implementation 
problem, which resulted in a strong sense of betrayal, could not be overcome by additional SDT 
provisions that allowed technical assistance and longer transition periods.49 
2. The WTO-Sustainable Development Goals Disconnect 
The trade-development convergence is presumed to have entered a new stage during the Doha 
Round.  However, the SDT-focused agenda disconnected the WTO from the SDGs.  Economically, 
the Doha Development Agenda was expected to rectify the unfairness of the Uruguay Round and 
                                                          
46 See generally Gene M. Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of 
GSP, 4:1 WORLD TRADE REV. 41, 41-43 (2005). 
47 Trade and Development Report (2014), at 67-68; JAMES M. CYPHER, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
238 (4th ed. 2014). 
48 The neoliberal package of the Washington Consensus includes ten points such as the liberalization of trade and 
foreign direct investment.  John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, in THE WASHINGTON 
CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14, 16-17 (Narcís Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz 
eds. 2008). 
49 See Don McRae, Developing Countries and ‘The Future of the WTO,’ 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 603, 603 (2005) (“The 
Uruguay Round is often portrayed as a betrayal”); J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay 
Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 24:4 WORLD ECON. 511, 514 (2000) (stating the South has “taken 
on bound commitments to implement in exchange for unbound commitments of assistance”); Chantal Thomas & Joel 
P Trachtman, supra note 17, at 8-10 (discussing the emergence of new special and differential treatment (SDT) in the 
Uruguay Round). 
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facilitate the conclusion of current negotiations.  Politically, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
fostering development and eliminating poverty were perceived to be effective responses for 
fighting extremism.50  Moreover, the UN has constantly stressed the WTO’s role in realizing the 
MDGs and SDGs.51 
Given the proliferating SDT measures, the central question is whether Doha development 
targets can be achieved.  The answer is in the negative.  First, WTO development goals remain 
unachievable promises as a result of the mismatch of expectations.  The non-reciprocity principle 
ignores the political reality and ultimately undermines developing countries’ participation in 
multilateral trade negotiations.  Without the Grand Bargain, the South only garnered limited 
market access to developed markets and thus restricted export-led growth.52 
Second, GSP preferences are often eroded by economic and political considerations.  In theory, 
the Enabling Clause provides a deviation from the MFN principle.53  EC-Tariff Preferences, in 
which India challenged the European GSP scheme, raised a fundamental issue.54  As the Enabling 
Clause merely stipulates that donor countries “may” grant preferential treatment to developing 
countries, it imposes “no legal obligation” for providing the GSP.55  Furthermore, GSP benefits 
may unilaterally differ in order to “respond positively” to developing countries’ development 
needs and such needs are subject to the sole discretion of the developed countries.56  In practice, 
the US and EU GSP systems exclude eligible countries that crossed the economic benchmarks 
                                                          
50 Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45:1 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 
8-9 (2009); Cho, supra note 6, at 574. 
51 Millennium Development Goals (2000), Goal 8; Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goal 17. 
52 See generally Ostry, supra note 22, at 285-289; HUDEC, supra note 14, at 179-85. 
53 Enabling Clause (1979), para. 1. 
54 Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
WT/DS246/R, adopted Apr. 20, 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS246/AB/R, DSR 2004:III [EC – 
Tariff Preferences], at 1009. 
55 Id. at para. 7.38. 
56 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 165; Grossman & Sykes, supra note 46, at 51-52. 
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under the graduation method and restrict their market access owing to domestic protectionist 
demands.57 
Third, Uruguay Round-created SDT measures suffer from inherent weaknesses in their design.  
These measures predominantly neglect the link between countries’ technical assistance needs and 
their capacity to implement WTO obligations.58  The transition periods under WTO agreements 
are also arbitrarily determined.59  Most technical assistance projects increase awareness of WTO 
law by offering educational courses, but fail to advise WTO members how to conduct trade reform, 
which requires knowledge beyond WTO rules.   
Finally, most SDT provisions encourage developed countries to “give every effort” or 
“particular attention” to the needs of developing countries.60  Such hortatory obligations are rarely 
enforced in WTO disputes.  For example, in China-Raw Materials, China invoked the 
development argument in justifying its export constraints on raw materials such as bauxite and 
zinc.61  The legal basis on which Beijing relied was Article XXXVI:5, one of the trade and 
                                                          
57 For the explanations of the US and European Union (EU) GSP schemes, see Caf Dowlah, Trade Preferences and 
Economic Growth: An Assessment of the U.S. GSP Schemes in the Context of Least Developed Countries, in LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 334, 337-50 (Yong-Shik Lee et al. eds. 2011); Grossman 
& Sykes, supra note 46, at 44-47. 
58 The only exception is Section II of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (2014).  See Azevêdo Launches New WTO 
Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility to Deliver Support to LDCs and Developing Countries, July 22, 2014, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/fac_22jul14_e.htm (“For the first time in WTO history, the 
requirement to implement the Agreement was directly linked to the capacity of the country to do so.”). 
59 For instance, longer transition periods were granted to developing countries under the Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures.  World Trade Report 2014 – Trade and Development: Recent Trends and the 
Role of the WTO (2014) [World Trade Report (2014)], at 194-95. 
60 E.g., GATT (1994), art. XXXVII:3(a) & the TBT Agreement (1995), art. 12.2.  Among the 148 SDT provisions in 
WTO agreements, the GATT and the TBT Agreement include most SDT provisions.  Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, supra note 20, at 5. 
61 Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and 
Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted Feb. 22, 2012, as modified by 
Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, at 3501, para. 
7.275-404. 
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development provisions in Part IV of the GATT.62  Nevertheless, the panel rejected the argument, 
explaining that Article XXXVI:5 does not assist in the interpretation of Article XI and Article 
XX(g).63 
The rare incidences in which SDT has been recognized relate only to non-substantive issues.  
In Indonesia-Autos, the arbitrator noted the “interests of developing country Members” 
requirement under Article 21.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 64   The “reasonable 
period of time” for Indonesia to implement the WTO decision was therefore extended by six 
months.65  To the dismay of developing countries, it is impractical to transform the promises of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration to operationalize SDT provisions into making them mandatory.66  
The far-reaching redistributive transformation of according all SDT provisions binding authority 
will damage the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system that underpins the rule-based 
trading system. 
B. Power Shifts in the Age of Global Regionalism 
The unrealistic promises of development in the Doha Round are the result of the SDT-centered 
approach.  This flawed approach, underpinned by an erroneous assumption of developing countries, 
is politically correct but unrealistic in multilateral trade negotiations.  The Doha Round deadlock 
entrenched by agriculture and NAMA issues has crippled the expected realization of the SDGs 
through the WTO.  At this juncture, a “Plan B” for accomplishing development goals is becoming 
                                                          
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry – Arbitration under Article 
21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12, Dec. 7, 1998, DSR 1998:IX, at 4029, 
para. 23-24. 
65 Id. para. 25. 
66 See generally Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, para. 44. 
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an urgent global matter.  Against this background, I argue that the emerging New Regional 
Economic Order serves as a feasible alternative for strengthening pro-development trade policy.  
Based on realist and dependency theories, the contemporary South-South cooperation in Asia-
Pacific regionalism signifies a paradigm shift in the trade-development nexus.  The legal 
experiments, intertwined with geopolitical complexities, provide valuable lessons for the Global 
South such as Africa and Latin America. 
1. Geopolitical Dimensions in the Doha Round 
This article thus shifts the traditional trade-development debate to a new dimension related to 
the role of developing countries in global regionalism.  Traditionally, developing countries have 
favored multilateralism, as regionalism strengthens the power of the developed nations due to their 
“divide and conquer” strategy in bilateral negotiations.  The NREO is changing the paradigm.  
Sharing the aspiration of the NIEO, the NREO fortifies the collective power of developing 
countries.  However, distinct from the NIEO, the NREO does not challenge the normative 
principles of trade norms by requesting SDT exceptions.  Instead, the NREO pursues development 
goals through deep integration in FTAs and reconstructs the neo-colonial dependency of the South 
on the North.  Bhagwati coined the term “First Regionalism” in reference to the proliferation of 
FTAs in the 1960s and explained their collapse as a result of the nations’ having unduly placed 
political considerations ahead of trade liberalization.67  In “Second Regionalism” in the 1980s, 
Bhagwati observed the relative success of the EU’s single market and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) because of their strong economic motivations.68 
                                                          
67 Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 538-39.  For the elaboration on the First Regionalism, refer to Sungjoon Cho, Breaking 
the Barrier between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42: 2 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 419, 426-57 (2001). 
68 Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 540-42.  Other examples in the Asia-Pacific include ASEAN Free Trade Area and the 
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In my view, the NREO has surfaced in “Third Regionalism,” which has coincided with the 
Doha Round since the 2000s.69  The five-fold growth of trade pacts in the past two decades leading 
to 406 FTAs in 2015 demonstrates the significance of global regionalism.70  Third Regionalism 
encompasses distinct characteristics.  Representing 75% of FTAs worldwide, the FTAs between 
developing countries (South-South FTAs) have substantially outpaced the agreements between 
developed countries and developing countries (North-South FTAs).71 
In contrast with the first two waves of regionalism, almost 80% of South-South FTAs expedite 
liberalization through WTO-plus components in the absence of the North’s political pressure.72  
Also notably, the mega FTAs that focus on the Asia-Pacific are becoming a game changer in 
international economic law.73  By solving the balkanization of bilateral FTAs, the mega FTAs have 
established new global norms and rendered the decline of the WTO in political discourse.   
Structural geopolitical transitions led to the NREO in Third Regionalism.  Emerging Asian 
regionalism transformed the world to multi-polar economic governance.74  Following FTAs with 
Singapore and Australia, the “pivot to Asia” policy reinforces America’s rebalance towards the 
economic power of the Asia-Pacific by concluding the FTA with Korea and the TPP.75  The EU, 
                                                          
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  World Trade Report 2011 – The WTO and Preferential Trade 
Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence (2011) [World Trade Report (2011)], at 52-53. 
69 Again, what I called “Third Regionalism” refers to the development of Asia-Pacific FTAs from the 2000s to the 
present.  
70 The number of FTAs increased from approximately 50 in the 1990s to more than 250 in 2010.  World Trade Report 
(2011), supra note 68, at 55; Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the World, 1948-2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2015). 
71 South-South FTAs represented only 20% of FTAs in the 1970s and North-North FTAs currently represent barely 
10%.  World Trade Report (2011), supra note 68, at 55-56.  
72 See Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai, Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 
431 (2013), at 8-9 (concluding that 77% of surveyed Asian FTAs are WTO-plus, including some or all Singapore 
issues). 
73 In addition to Asia-Pacific focused mega FTAs, including the TPP and the RCEP, the US and the EU are currently 
negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. 
74 For the development of Asian regionalism, see generally Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asian Regionalism: 
A Partnership for Shared Prosperity (2008). 
75 See generally William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade 
Pasha L. Hsieh 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, vol. 37 (forthcoming 2016-17) 
19 
 
which forms a trans-Atlantic alliance for global trade, also followed the trend by signing FTAs 
with Asian partners.76  Consequently, Washington and Brussels moved from their antagonistic 
stance on the NIEO to a more receptive posture of the emerging NREO.77 
In the new multi-polar structure, developing countries have maneuvered a balance of power 
policy by augmenting their collective power through a new hub-and-spoke system.  South-South 
cooperation consolidates the bloc by cementing internal and external FTAs, mutually reinforcing 
their levels of trade liberalization.  The notion of “ASEAN centrality” exemplifies the convergence 
of the inward economic integration and outward agreements with regional powers such as China, 
Japan and India.78  Moreover, divergent from their pessimistic requests focusing on SDT in the 
WTO, selected developing countries, including LDCs, have engaged in the market access-based 
Grand Bargain and benefited from South-centered regionalism.  The impressive poverty reduction 
of Cambodia and Vietnam epitomizes the resultant trade-led growth.79  The elevation of ASEAN’s 
aggregated economic power, in turn, reinforces the blocs’ bargaining capacity with the North in 
global negotiations. 
2. Realist and Dependency Theories 
                                                          
Policy, Congressional Research Service Report (2014), at 1-8; Morton H. Halperin et al., South Korea and the U.S. 
Rebalance Toward Asia, Apr. 3, 2013, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/south-korea-and-the-us-pivot-to-asia (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2015). 
76 The EU concluded FTAs with South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam.  European Commission, Trade for All: Towards 
a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (2015), at 30-32. 
77 See Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Relations, Nov. 21, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/11/21/fact-sheet-us-asean-relations (“The United States supports ASEAN’s central role in many of the 
region’s key institutions and works closely with ASEAN to strengthen Asia’s regional architecture.”). 
78 See Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2012) 
(“Negotiations for the RCEP will recognize ASEAN Centrality in the emerging regional economic architecture 
and the interests of ASEAN’s FTA Partners . . . .”).  The RCEP will materialize ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 initiatives.  
Urata, supra note 28, at 1-8. 
79 Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2013 – With Perspectives on China and India: Narrowing Development Gap 
(2013), at 246-48; Sok Siphana, Mainstreaming Trade for Poverty Alleviation: A Cambodian Experience, 5:2 DEV. 
OUTREACH 7, 8-9 (2003). 
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To respond to these contemporary challenges to international economic law, I offer theoretical 
explanations for the trade-development nexus in the NREO.  Political theorists have 
conventionally stressed the development dimensions of North-South trade. 80   This research 
enriches the existing literature by examining the latest development of South-South trade.81  The 
realist and dependency theories will be utilized to explain the comparison between the NREO that 
prompts South-South cooperation and the NIEO, which hinges on North-South conflicts. 
Represented by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, realism is one of the oldest theories of 
political science.82  Realists define the international system as an anarchy that makes self-help 
essential for the survival of the countries.83  As rational actors, states pursue their power according 
to their national interests in the hegemonic world.84  Realism also influences mercantilism in 
international political economy by perceiving global trade as a zero-sum game that compels 
nations to maximize their economic benefits.85 
The dependency school shares the realist angle of national interests, but interprets the 
international system from a South-based perspective.86  According to Theotonio Dos Santos and 
                                                          
80 Trade-development debates on North-South trade, which focuses on the relations between the EU and African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, will be discussed below. 
81 The existing literature on South-South trade is either outdated or fails to analyze the development dimensions from 
a theoretical perspective.  E.g., David Greenaway & Chris Milner, South-South Trade: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 
5:1 WORLD BANK OBSERVER 47 (1990); James Scott, South-South Trade and North-South Politics: Emerging Powers 
and the Reconfiguration of Global Governance, BWPI Working Paper, No. 131 (2010). 
82 Realism is primarily based on HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1954) and KENNETH WALTZ’S 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).  William C. Wohlforth, Realism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131, 132-37 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds. 2008). 
83 Id. 
84  Id.; Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale, International Relations, Principal Theories, in Oxford Public 
International Law: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e722?rskey=X2BUQa&result=1&prd=EPIL (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); Robert Keohane, Theory of World Politics: 
Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 198-99 (Robert O. Keohane ed. 1986). 
85 INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POWER AND PURPOSE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 194 (Paul D’Anieri ed. 2011). 
86 ALAN GILBERT, MUST GLOBAL POLITICS CONSTRAIN DEMOCRACY? GREAT-POWER REALISM, DEMOCRATIC PEACE, 
AND DEMOCRATIC INTERNATIONALISM 32-33 (1999); ALVIN Y. SO, SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: 
MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND WORLD-SYSTEM THEORIES 91-98 (1990). 
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Prebisch, the NIEO forerunner, the “underdevelopment” dilemma is due to the unequal neo-
colonial trade relationship between dominant and subordinate economies.87  Dependency theorists 
contended that the ongoing external unfairness has subjected the development of developing 
countries to the interests of developed countries. 88   International trade only aggravates such 
dependency and the inequality among nations by escalating the flow of the South’s economic 
surplus to the North.89 
As the significant model for North-South trade-development relations, the 1975 Lomé 
Convention was signed between the EU and former colonies, collectively known as the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.90  The Lomé Convention responded to the NIEO demands 
by incorporating SDT that granted preferential treatment to ACP exports.91  Fundamental changes 
galvanized the EU’s policy shift.  First, the EU lost the “banana war” in the GATT and the WTO 
in which non-ACP countries challenged the legality of the EU’s preferential banana quotas for 
ACP countries.92  These cases mandated the revision of the WTO-incompatible policy.  Second, 
the fact that ACP countries could not “even maintain market share in the EU” evidences the futility 
of development goals of the Lomé Convention.93  Development thinking of major EU countries, 
                                                          
87 Dos Santos, supra note 30, at 232-34; FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 16-17 (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans.1979); GAVIN FRIDELL, FAIR TRADE 
COFFEE: THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF MARKET-DRIVEN SOCIAL JUSTICE 31 (2007). 
88 SO, supra note 86, at 95-102. 
89 Id. 
90 See generally Ole Elgström, Lomé and Post-Lomé: Asymmetric Negotiations and the Impact of Terms, 5 EURO. 
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 175, 175-77 (2000); Maurzio Carbone & Jan Orbie, Beyond Economic Partnership Agreements: 
The European Union and the Trade-Development Nexus, 20:1 CONTEMP. POL. 1, 1-2 (2014). 
91 Tony Heron, Trading in Development: Norms and Institutions in the Making/Unmaking of European Union-African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Trade and Development Cooperation, in THE TRADE-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN THE EUROPEAN: 
DIFFERENTIATION, COHERENCE AND NORMS 10, 12-13 (Maurzio Carbone & Jan Orbie eds. 2015). 
92 For the introduction to Banana cases, see Simi T.B. & Atul Kauship, The Banana War at the GATT/WTO, TRADE L. 
BRIEF, No. 1 (2008), at 1-4; Banana War Ends after 20 Years, BBC, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
20263308.  See also Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, ‘We Care about you, but . . .’: The Politics of EU Trade 
Policy and Development, 26:3 CAM. REV. INT’L AFF. 497, 501-02 (detailing the impact of the 1994 GATT case on the 
EU’s ACP policy). 
93 European Commission, Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve 
of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, Nov. 20, 1996, at Ch. 2. 
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including Germany and the United Kingdom, also changed from attaching ties with former 
European colonies to stressing the needs of the LDCs and alleviating global poverty.94  For these 
reasons, the EU revolutionarily replaced the non-reciprocity policy with the reciprocal Cotonou 
Agreement and its related Economic Partnership Agreements in the 2000s.95  
From the viewpoints of realist and dependency theories, the failure of the EU scheme illustrates 
the structural weaknesses of development policy in North-South trade agreements.  The asymmetry 
of the bargaining power between the EU and ACP countries allowed the former to dictate the terms 
of the agreements based on European national interests.96  Preferential trade relations with the EU 
magnified its normative power rather than addressing the development needs of the South.  In 
essence, the Europe-centric “development-friendly” regime distorted ACP countries’ effective 
resource allocation and hindered industrialization.  The economic flow to Europe was expedited 
because the value of industrial imports substantially outweighed that of agricultural exports, thus 
exacerbating ACP countries’ dependency on Europe. 
The evolution of the NREO is based on the changing nature of South-South trade.  Prebisch 
argued for South-South trade as a means to end developing countries’ dependency on developed 
countries, but this position waned following the NIEO’s failure.97  The economic rationale for 
                                                          
94 For positions of major EU countries, see Elgström, supra note 90, at 188-89; Young & Peterson, supra note 92, at 
501. 
95 Information on the Utilisation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4, 
Feb. 7, 2002, at 13.  Even the new Economic Partnership Agreements resulted in limited welfare gains in the Caribbean 
Community where only the Dominican Republic expanded exports to the EU because of relative competitive products.  
Sheldon McLean et al., Trade and Development Nexus: Reflections on the Performance of Trade in Goods under the 
CARIFORUM-European Union Partnership Agreement: A CARIFORUM Perspective, LC/CAR/L.458, Dec. 16, 2014, 
at 7 & 23. 
96  See Katharina Serrano, The Trade-Development Nexus in EU-Pacific Relations: Realism, Dependence or 
Interdependence, 23:1 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 89, 107-09 (2011) (analyzing the EU’s bargaining power 
and self-interests). 
97 Adekeye Adebajo, Two Prophets of Regional Integration: Prebisch and Adedeji, in INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: 
IDEAS, EXPERIENCE, AND PROSPECTS 323, 328 (Bruce Currie-Alder et al. eds. 2014). 
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South-South trade includes decreasing the dependency on the North by diversifying risks and 
increasing self-reliance through the import substitution policy.98  Given limited domestic markets, 
it became essential for developing countries to expand the suitable overseas market, where they 
would not suffer from a weaker comparative advantage.99  Commentators have criticized the 
development potential in South-South trade on the ground that the validity of such arrangements 
is confined by economies of scale and the prevalent use of non-tariff-barriers (NTBs).100  The 
NREO development refutes this pessimistic contention. 
The NREO emerged in Third Regionalism with different geopolitical complexities.  South-
South trade grew from 8% to 25% of international trade, and the proliferation of Asia-Pacific FTAs 
in the Doha Round reflects this trend.101  The paradigm shift in a high degree of Asia-Pacific 
regionalism provides an impetus for the trade-development linkage.  Realism posits that 
competition necessitated by “self-help” makes it difficult for countries to cooperate on trade 
liberalization.102   Nevertheless, cooperation can be a salient way of self-help when national 
interests overlap.103  Driven by geographic proximity and comparable economic levels, South-
South trade likely involves less of the economic conflict inherent in North-South trade.  The 
convergence of trade and development interests has prompted the conclusion of a new generation 
WTO-plus South-South FTAs.  The inclusion of emerging markets in the Asia-Pacific improves 
economies of scale and consolidates the regional supply chains. 
                                                          
98 Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 539; Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49-50; South-South Regionalism and Trade 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (2008), at 5-7.  
99 Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49-50.  Cf. South-South Regionalism and Trade Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific Region (2008), at viii & 5-8. 
100 ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 267-68; Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49-50.  
101 See World Trade Report (2014), supra note 59, at 42 (stating that “South-South trade . . . has grown from 8 per cent 
of world trade in 1990 to around 25 per cent today, and is projected to reach 30 per cent by 2030”); World Trade 
Report (2011), supra note 68, at 59 (indicating the increase of Asia-based FTAs). 
102 See Glaser, supra note 30, at 50-51 (discussing the realist view of cooperation in security issues).   
103 Id. at 53; Serrano, supra note 96, at 111. 
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The dependency theory may not fully explain the progression of North-South relations in the 
NREO.  The classical dependency school suggests that as dominant-subordinate relations 
perpetuate underdevelopment of the South, the only “way out” is to sever trade ties with developed 
countries.104  Albeit structural weaknesses in North-South trade, the development impact of capital 
and technology from developed nations cannot be utterly disregarded.  The isolation stance also 
contradicts the evolution of export-oriented Asian economies and their trans-regional FTAs with 
the United States and the EU. 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Thomas Gold propounded the “new dependency theory,” 
which acknowledges the co-existence of dependency and development.105  Unlike the classical 
theory, which is preoccupied with the external unequal condition, the new theory focuses on the 
impact of evolving internal structures on altering the South’s relations with the North. 106  
Dependency is dynamic, as developing countries can effectively transform dependent capitalism 
to a neo-liberal export-oriented economy.107   The South’s high value-added exports, such as 
information technology (IT) products, have helped reverse the traditional North-bound economic 
flow.  The supply chain adjusted in accordance with South-South FTAs also increases the cost 
competitiveness in developed markets.  Hence, the new dependency theory offers a theoretical 
response to the NREO, as developing countries collectively reconstruct the conventional 
dominant-subordinate relations by formulating a pro-development trade scheme. 
                                                          
104 SO, supra note 86, at 104-05. 
105 See generally FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO, REINVENTING DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL (1999); THOMAS BARON 
GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE (1986); SO, supra note 86, at 164-65. 
106 Serrano, supra note 96, at 104; SO, supra note 86, at 137-42. 
107 Gold examined Taiwan’s development model and explained how the country transformed its dependent relations 
with Japan and the United States to become a neoliberal export-oriented economy.  See generally GOLD, supra note 
105, at 21-90; SO, supra note 86, at 157-64. 
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III. The Paradigm Shift: In Search of the New Regional Economic Order 
The Doha Round has failed to cement the trade-development nexus in the WTO.  The flawed 
approach to development through SDT overlooks the reality of the Grand Bargain in the 
multilateral trading system.  The NREO that surfaced in Third Regionalism provides a feasible 
“Plan B” for developing countries.  By legalizing pro-development policy in FTAs, South-South 
cooperation reflects the latest development in Asia-Pacific FTAs and signifies the developing 
countries’ changing position from rule-takers to rule-makers in international economic law.  The 
case study of ASEAN will substantiate the expectations of realism and the new dependency theory.  
The creation of the AEC reinforces a paradigm shift in Asia-Pacific regionalism and provides the 
Global South with critical lessons to implement the SDGs through regional integration. 
A. The Creation of the ASEAN Economic Community 
As a crucial pillar of the ASEAN Community, the establishment of the AEC in 2015 marked 
a milestone for South-South FTAs and global regionalism.108  The AEC fortifies the multi-polar 
structure in international economic law, since the bloc moves toward forming one of the world’s 
four largest economies, following the United States, the EU and China.109   Tellingly, a vast 
development gap exists between the six original nations (ASEAN-6) and the four newer LDC 
members – Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV countries).110  It is therefore crucial 
                                                          
108 See Kuala Lumpur Declaration (2015), supra note 28 (“D[eclaring] the formal establishment of the ASEAN 
Community on 31 December 2015.”).  The ASEAN Community consists of the AEC, the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.  Id. 
109 See Lord Davies, UK-ASEAN Business Council, in INVESTING IN ASEAN 11, 11 (2013-14) (“The ten ASEAN 
member states currently have a combined [Gross Domestic Product (GDP)] similar to the UK’s, and by 2030, the 
ASEAN economy is predicted to be the fourth largest single market after the EU, US and China.”). 
110 “ASEAN-6” countries include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  GDP per 
capita of Singapore is 44 times that of Myanmar in 2014.  Table 7: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in ASEAN, at 
Current Prices (Nominal), in US Dollars (2015), http://www.asean.org/images/2015/september/macroeconomics-
indicator/T7_Aug15.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
Pasha L. Hsieh 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, vol. 37 (forthcoming 2016-17) 
26 
 
to design a legal framework that implements the SDGs in economic integration balanced with 
diverse development needs. 
The founding of ASEAN in 1967 was primarily driven by political rather than economic 
considerations to form solidarity against the spread of communism and to peacefully settle 
territorial disputes.111  The post-colonial mindset energized the “ASEAN way” of alliance that 
emphasizes non-intervention and consensus-based principles.112   ASEAN’s soft-law approach 
based on horizontal integration features its significant difference from the EU, which has followed 
a hard-law, top-down approach to achieve the economic union.113  In 1992, faced with global 
regionalism and the rise of China and India, ASEAN countries switched their focus to economic 
integration by forging the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).114  Nonetheless, the effectiveness of 
the AFTA was undermined by the low rate of utilization because of insignificant margins of 
preferences and complex procedures to qualify the rules of origin.115   
In 2007, ASEAN bolstered the integration by approving the ASEAN Economic Community 
Blueprint (AEC Blueprint), which set 2015 as the target for forming “a single market and 
production base.”116   The adoption of the ASEAN Charter formally transformed the loosely 
connected bloc into an internal-governmental institution that accelerates the meeting of the AEC 
                                                          
111 Rodolfo C. Severino, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN SEARCH OF AN ASEAN COMMUNITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE FORMER 
ASEAN SECRETARY-GENERAL 1-7 (2006).  For intra-ASEAN territorial disputes, see Walter Woon, Resolving 
Territorial Disputes in ASEAN, 30 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 1, 3-10 (2012). 
112 Id. at 1-37.  See also Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007), preamble (stressing the respect 
for “the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity”). 
113 In contrast with hard law, soft law motivates integration by peer pressure rather than enforcement.  For four different 
types of economic integration in preferential trade arrangements, see Cooper, supra note 75, at 2. 
114 See generally SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 16-21; Chia Siow Yue, The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 11:2 PAC. REV. 
213, 213-17 (1998). 
115 Ganeshan Wignaraja, Regional Trade Agreements and Enterprises in Southeast Asia, ADBI Working Paper Series, 
No. 442 (2013), at 4. 
116 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 22.  Note that in 2015, ASEAN also adopted the 
ASEAN Blueprint 2025.  ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 1.  
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goals.117  Due to the EU’s embedded problems with the euro crisis and border control, the AEC 
envisions becoming an FTA-plus arrangement rather than following the European model as an 
economic union. 
The legalization of the AEC, which connects ten diverse developing countries, illustrates 
South-South cooperation in the NREO.  The AEC framework is built upon ASEAN agreements 
that govern trade in goods, services, investments and dispute settlement mechanisms.  The ASEAN 
Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) eliminates NTBs and incorporates previous goods-related 
agreements concluded since the formation of the AFTA.118  Based on the incremental “package” 
structure, negotiations under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) led to 
multiple packages of services commitments.119 
The mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) and the ASEAN Agreement on the Movement 
of Natural Persons (ASEAN MNP Agreement) complement the AFAS by liberalizing the flow of 
intra-regional skilled labor.120  To increase the bloc’s competitiveness to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) integrates prior 
agreements, thus streamlining the schedule of reservations and according benefits to ASEAN 
investors.121  ASEAN has also developed multi-layered dispute settlement mechanisms.  Non-
economic conflicts can be resolved under ASEAN’s first legally binding treaty, the Treaty of 
                                                          
117  See Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007), art. 3 (“ASEAN, as inter-governmental 
organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality.”). 
118 Kanya Satyani Sasradipoera, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), in ASEAN: LIFE AFTER THE CHARTER 
89, 90-92 (S. Tiwari ed. 2010). 
119 ASEAN Integration in Services (2013), at 3-13. 
120 Id. at 15-17. 
121  The new agreement integrates the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (1987 
Agreement), the 1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area, and two related protocols.  Yap Lai 
Peng, The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009: Its Objectives, Plan and Progress, in ASEAN: LIFE 
AFTER THE CHARTER 100, 101 (S. Tiwari ed. 2010). 
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Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the subsequent ASEAN Charter.122  Trade disputes fall within 
the realm of the ASEAN Protocol for Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM).123  The 
TAC and the EDSM focus on state-to-state disputes, whereas the ACIA confers private investors 
the right to resort to investor-state arbitration.124 
B. Regional and Mega FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
Unlike French-German coordination that contributed to European integration, the leadership 
vacuum due to the China-Japan rivalry allows ASEAN to play an indispensable role in Asia-
Pacific regionalism.  The realist assertion that mutual interests prompt cooperation is demonstrated 
not only in the AEC that legalizes internal integration, but also in ASEAN’s external FTAs.  Since 
2002, ASEAN concluded five ASEAN+1 FTAs with China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia and 
New Zealand.125  The internal and external FTAs form an interlocked mechanism, resulting in the 
FTA-wide de facto MFN effect that mutually reinforces trade liberalization. 
The ASEAN framework also validates the premise of the new dependency theory to transform 
the South’s neo-colonial trade relations with the North.  The AEC and the FTAs with China and 
India illustrate South-South cooperation in Third Regionalism.  The “North” encompasses intra-
regional developed economies such as Japan and Australia and extra-regional powers, including 
                                                          
122 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 11-12; Locknie Hsu, The ASEAN Dispute Settlement System, in THE ASEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 380, 383-386 (Sanchita Basu Das et al. eds. 2013). 
123 Hsu, supra note 122, at 386-89. 
124 Id.  Note that the 2003 case of Yaung Chi Oo Trading v. Myanmar was the first and only instance where ASEAN 
dealt with legal disputes.  The investor-state dispute concerned the interpretation of the 1987 Agreement and the 
Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction.  Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, 
ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1. 
125 ASEAN’s first external FTA was concluded with China in 2002.  ASEAN Economic Community Factbook (2011), 
at 81-90. 
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the United States and the EU.126  These developments not only repudiate the contentions against 
South-South FTAs, but also buttress the analysis of the NREO.  
Built on the five ASEAN+1 FTAs, the ASEAN-based RCEP will create a market that links 16 
Asia-Pacific countries.127  The two mega FTAs, the RCEP and the TPP, will form the pathways to 
the prospective Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) leaders endorsed.128  The RCEP is expected to increase businesses’ FTA 
utilization by solving the “noodle bowl” syndrome because of the complex rules of origin.129  More 
profoundly, the RCEP will strengthen ASEAN’s assertive balance of power strategy that 
converges the South-South and North-South FTAs under the notion of ASEAN centrality. 
In essence, both ASEAN’s internal and external FTAs regionalize WTO-type special and 
preferential treatment.  A critical feature is permitting CLMV countries to have longer transition 
periods to phase out tariffs and NTBs.130  Under the AEC, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration 
(IAI) proposes to narrow the regional development gap and alleviate poverty by providing 
technical assistance to implement economic integration.131  Provisions on capacity building of 
ASEAN+1 FTAs that focus on the least developed CLMV countries also complement the IAI.132  
                                                          
126 See Clinton, supra note 26, at 61 (emphasizing US engagement in ASEAN); European Commission, supra note 76, 
at 32 (indicating the negotiations for the EU-ASEAN FTA). 
127 The 16 countries include ten ASEAN states and six FTA partners.  For an analysis of the RCEP, see A Powerhouse 
Merger in RCEP, MBC Research Report, No. 110 (2013), at 2-5; Urata, supra note 28, at 6-9. 
128 2015 Leaders’ Declaration: The 23rd APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration - Building Inclusive Economies, 
Building a Better World: A Vision for an Asia-Pacific Community (2015), sec. 7(b).  Currently, four ASEAN members 
are in both the TPP and the RCEP and seven ASEAN states are APEC members.  The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
https://ustr.gov/tpp/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); APEC Outcomes & Outlook (2014-2015), at 51. 
129 See Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism, ADB Working 
Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 7 (2007), at 4 (referring the problem due to “an unorganized 
tangle of bilateral trade deals”). 
130 Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV countries) usually have five or more years to eliminate tariffs in 
the AEC and five ASEAN+1 FTAs.  Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 22-23; Urata, supra 
note 28, at 15. 
131 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 95-106. 
132 E.g., Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the Member 
Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (2002) [ASEAN-China 
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In dispute settlement provisions, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA specifically recognizes 
SDT.133   If a given dispute involves an ASEAN LDC, other countries shall give “particular 
sympathetic consideration.”134  Moreover, the arbitral tribunal is obliged to “explicitly indicate” 
how SDT provisions of the FTA have been taken into account.135 
C. The Services Trade-Oriented Approach to Development 
As argued previously, the NREO moved beyond the SDT-centered agenda of the NIEO.  What 
evidences the NREO is not simply the design of SDT provisions in ASEAN-based FTAs, but the 
Grand Bargain in which developing countries have engaged and the resultant trade-led 
development effect.  As of 2015, Southeast Asia exceeded the target of the MDGs by halving the 
population living in extreme poverty.136  Yet, to “[e]nd poverty in all its forms” under the SDGs 
requires a revolutionary strategy to assist 30% of ASEAN’s poor still living on less than US$2 a 
day. 137   Against this backdrop, I propose a holistic services trade-oriented approach to 
development.  The regulatory reform proposals that bridge the gap between the law and practice 
will invigorate the trade-development nexus and offer the best practices for South-South FTAs. 
The Grand Bargain among the ten ASEAN countries has virtually achieved the zero-tariff 
target.138  Compared with trade in goods, liberalizing trade in services is far more politically 
                                                          
Framework Agreement], art. 7; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the 
Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea 
(2005), art. 3.2. 
133 Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (2009), art. 18, Ch. 17. 
134 Id. art. 18:1, Ch. 17. 
135 Id. art. 18:2, Ch. 17. 
136 Millennium Development Goals Report (2015), at 14 (showing an 84% decrease in the proportion of people living 
in extreme poverty in Southeast Asia between 1990 and 2015). 
137 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goal 1; Report of the ASEAN Regional Assessment of MDG Achievement 
and Post-2015 Development Priorities (2015), at 19. 
138 The ASEAN Free Trade Area requires ASEAN-6 countries and CLMV countries to eliminate tariffs on intra-
ASEAN goods by 2010 and 2015, respectively.  Masahiro Kawai & Kanda Naknoi, ASEAN Economic Integration 
through Trade and Foreign Direct Investment: Long-Term Challenges, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 545 (2015), 
at 12; Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 22-23. 
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sensitive because the service sector involves the inflow of foreign capital and labor.  The behind-
the-border barriers to services trade make the negotiations inherently complex.  At the global level, 
the Doha Round standoff has stalled much-needed services trade talks.  The ongoing plurilateral 
negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement involve very few developing countries, including 
none of the ASEAN states.139  Before demonstrating ASEAN’s trade liberalization as an NREO 
approach to South-South regionalism, it is important to understand the oft-ignored impact of 
service trades on development and poverty reduction. 
First, the reduction of barriers to services trade empirically leads to significant GDP gains and 
stipulates more economic competitiveness than mere tariff eliminations.140  Development policies 
have traditionally centered on manufacturing rather than services.141  Contrary to the conventional 
understanding that services should only be prioritized at an advanced development stage, services 
are a prerequisite to inclusive development and economic modernization.142  Notably, transport, 
finance and Internet services constitute the backbone of trade in goods.  The fact that a 10% 
increase in trade in services results in a 6% growth in trade in goods is evidence of the strong 
correlation between the two major modes of trade.143 
Second, from the global perspective of development, the services trade has outgrown 
agriculture and mining and helped buttress the welfare of the poor.144  For example, health services 
                                                          
139  There are 23 participants in the negotiations.  Trade in Services Agreement List of Participants, 
https://ustr.gov/tisa/participant-list (last visited Nov. 27, 2015). 
140 Jeffery J. Schott et al., Prospects for Services Trade Negotiations, ADB Economics Workings Paper Series, No. 
319 (2012), at 16; Mid-Term Review of the Implementation of AEC Blueprint: Executive Summary (2012), at 30. 
141 ASEAN 2030: Toward a Borderless Economic Community [ASEAN 2030] 120 (2014). 
142 Zakariah Rashid et al., Regional Market for Goods, Services, and Skilled Labor, in REALIZING THE ASEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 20, 44 (Michael G. Plummer & Chia Siow Yue eds. 2009); 
ASEAN 2030, supra note 141, at 120. 
143 Juan Blyde & Natalia Sinyavskaya, The Impact of Liberalizing Trade in Services on Trade in Goods: An Empirical 
Investigation, 11:3 REV. DEV. ECON. 566, 573 (2007). 
144  ASEAN Integration Monitoring Report 93 (2013); Joy Abrenica et al., The Future of Trade in Services for 
Developing Countries, in TRADE AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: CASE STUDIES AND 
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liberalization maximizes the delivery of health care to the needy, and tourism services allow up to 
25% of tourism expenditures to directly reach the poor in LDCs.145  FDIs in developing countries 
are now primarily associated with the service sector and hence augment the effect of poverty 
reduction through job creation.146  Labor mobility in services trade results in a financial inflow of 
remittances and helps the poor escape poverty.147  In the case of the Philippines, remittances 
constitute 10% of the GDP and are mostly spent on rural families’ basic needs such as food and 
medical payment.148  The amount of remittances that Cambodia receives exceeds 50% of its 
overseas development aid, further evidencing the compelling impact of services trade on 
development.149   
Finally, trade in services provides new sources of development that help countries escape from 
the “middle-income trap” that often occurs in middle-income developing countries, such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.150   These countries rely on their low-cost, labor-intensive 
advantage as their initial development strategy.151  As industrialization and urbanization exhaust 
the pool of unskilled labor and push wage increases to their upper limit, the cost competitiveness 
                                                          
LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 341, 347-48 (Andrew L. Stoler et al. eds. 2009). 
145 Aaditya Mattoo & Gianni Zanini, Services Trade Agreements and Negotiations: An Overview, in HANDBOOK OF 
TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT 661, 665 (Arvid Lukauskas et al. eds. 2013); Jonathan Mitchell, An 
Unconventional but Essential Marriage: Pro-Poor Tourism and the Mainstream Industry, PRIVATE SECTOR & DEV., 
No. 7 (2010), at 5. 
146 See Mode 3 – Commercial Presence, S/C/W/314, Apr. 7, 2010, at 9 (“[S]ervices accounted for 65 per cent of 
developing economies’ inward FDI stock and for 86 per cent of their outward FDI . . . .”); ASEAN Community 2015: 
Managing Integration for Better Jobs and Shared Prosperity (2014) [ASEAN Community 2015], at 33 (discussing the 
significant job creation effect of services sectors in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines). 
147 IAN GOLDIN & KENNETH REINERT, GLOBALIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT: MEETING NEW CHALLENGES 197 (2012). 
148 Building Human Capital through Labor Migration in Asia (2015), at 14 & 37. 
149 In 2010, Cambodia received US$364 million in remittances and its net overseas development aid totaled US$0.7 
billion.  Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 (2d ed. 2011), at 84.  See also Rupa Chanda, Mobility of Less-
Skilled Workers under Bilateral Agreements: Lessons for the GATS, 43:3 J. WORLD TRADE 479, 479 
(“[R]emittances . . . outweigh official development assistance”). 
150 Tran Van Tho, The Middle-Income Trap: Issues for Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ADBI 
Working Paper Series, No. 421 (2013), at 22-29. 
151 Pierre-Richard Agénor et al., Avoiding Middle-Income Traps, ECO. PREMISE, No. 98 (2012), at 2-3. 
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is eroded and these countries become “stuck” in economic stagnation.152  The modernization of 
the services trade and the associated technology transformation are the essential impetus to take 
these countries to an elevated level of development.153 
IV. The Legalization of Trade-Development Policy 
Based on ASEAN’s evolution as a timely case study, this article provides the first examination 
of the realization of the UN Sustainable Development Goals through regional integration.  In Third 
Regionalism, the AEC integration through multi-layered FTAs manifests the paradigm shift 
toward the NREO.  As realism and the new dependency theories explain, the new generation of 
South-South cooperation expediting trade liberalization structurally revamps Southeast Asia’s 
neo-colonial relationship with developed countries.  Amid the Doha Round impasse, the regional 
approach to development serves as a feasible “Plan B.”  A holistic approach to services trade 
liberalization illustrates the legalization of trade-development policy that consolidates services 
commitments and facilitates labor mobility.  The roadmap for regulatory reform focuses on 
integrating development assistance, removing trade barriers, harmonizing domestic laws, and 
fortifying human rights protection under the FTA network.  An assessment of ASEAN’s existing 
framework and reform proposals in tandem with the SDGs provides valuable lessons for the Global 
South. 
A. Integrating and Multilateralizing Services Commitments 
                                                          
152 Id. 
153 Kenichi Ohno, The Middle Income Trap: Implications for Industrialization Strategies in East Asia and Africa, 
GRIP Development Forum (2008), at 93-112; Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2014: Beyond 
the Middle-Income Trap (2014), at 20. 
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Trade in services is the essential driver of development in ASEAN countries.154  The service 
sector, which accounts for 60% of FDI inflows and 50% of total employment, has contributed to 
the bloc’s noteworthy 76% surge in the GDP growth in recent years.155  Recognizing the growing 
prominence of the services trade, ASEAN states commenced negotiations under the AFAS in 
1995.156  The goal is to achieve “a free trade area in services” that exceeds the level of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).157  In the context of the SDGs, services trade energizes 
ASEAN’s implementation of poverty reduction, economic growth and elimination of the regional 
inequality.158  This development approach also creates employment opportunities for women and 
promotes gender equality.159 
Moreover, to avoid the political backlash that hampers liberalization in South-South FTAs, the 
AFAS adopted a successive package structure.  Schedules of services commitments concluded 
under multiple rounds of negotiations cumulatively “form an integral part of” the AFAS.160  Due 
to the AFAS’s non-self-executing nature, each state is required to sign the protocol that embodies 
specific commitments.161  Each package of commitments will not take effect until the completion 
of domestic ratification procedures. 162   The AFAS’ incremental approach eases domestic 
protectionism and facilitates domestic reforms.  In addition to the ten packages of services 
commitments (AFAS 1-10), ASEAN concluded separate packages of financial services and air 
                                                          
154 See generally Asian Development Outlook 2015: Financing Asia’s Future Growth (2015), at 209-47. 
155 ASEAN Services Integration Report (2015), at i-ii; A Blueprint for Growth – ASEAN Economic Community 2015: 
Progress and Key Achievements (2015), at 1. 
156 ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 27. 
157 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (1995) [AFAS], art. I(c). 
158 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goals 1, 8 and 10. 
159 Id. Goal 5; Jim Redden, Introduction, in TRADE AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: CASE 
STUDIES AND LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 1, 13 (Andrew L. Stoler et al. eds. 2009). 
160 Id. art. VIII. 
161 E.g., Protocol to Implement the Ninth Package of Commitments under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services (2014), arts. 4-5. 
162 Id. 
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transport services. 163   The AFAS incorporates these general and sector-specific services 
commitments and thus constitutes the AEC’s foundation of a single market and production base. 
Modeled after the GATS, the AFAS covers four modes of the services trade: Mode 1 (cross-
border supply), Mode 2 (consumption abroad), Mode 3 (commercial presence), and Mode 4 
(movement of natural persons or MNP).164  WTO members’ Modes 3 and 4 commitments are 
subject to the most restrictions.165  ASEAN countries’ liberalization of these modes under the 
AFAS demonstrates the developing countries’ Grand Bargain in South-based regionalism.  Given 
the importance of increasing the free flow of intra-regional professionals, the ASEAN MNP 
agreement will supersede Mode 4 commitments under the existing AFAS packages.166  The MRAs 
will further promote the movement of skilled labor by facilitating the recognition of qualifications 
for eight professions.167   More importantly, ASEAN expects to adopt the single undertaking 
approach to negotiate the comprehensive ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement (ATISA), which 
will consolidate various forms of services commitments.168 
The evolution of service negotiation modalities for the AEC provides legal and policy options 
for the NREO approach to development.  AFAS negotiations initially followed a more 
conservative GATS-like positive list formula.169  The request-and-offer bargain obliged ASEAN 
                                                          
163 As of November 2015, nine packages of AFAS commitments have been concluded.  While ASEAN economic 
ministers negotiated and signed the packages of the general AFAS commitments, the liberalization of financial services 
and air transport services was carried out by finance and transport ministers, respectively.  ASEAN Integration Report 
2015 (2015), at xix & 29; ASEAN Integration in Services (2013), at 13-14. 
164 General Agreement on Trade in Services (1994), art. I:2. 
165 Mode 3 – Commercial Presence, supra note 146, at 17; Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), S/C/W/301, Sept. 
15, 2009, at 20-25. 
166 ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (2012) [ASEAN MNP Agreement], art. 6:2. 
167 ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 33-34. 
168 Joint Media Statement, The 46th ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting, Aug. 25, 2014, at 5.  This approach 
follows the model of the 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA).  STEFANO INAMA & EDMUND W. SIM, 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PROFILE 127 (2015); 
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 6. 
169 This approach resulted in the first two packages of AFAS commitments (AFAS 1-2).  ASEAN Integration in 
Services (2013), at 10. 
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states to list the sectors and modes of supply that they wished to liberalize in binding schedules.  
The liberalization efforts were expedited by endorsing the common sub-sector approach, which 
denoted a sub-sector in which three or four ASEAN states made commitments in the GATS or 
previous AFAS packages.170  The concessions in the sub-sector had to be multilateralized to all 
ASEAN countries.  In other words, those countries that made no corresponding commitments 
could be free riders. 
To effectuate the Grand Bargain that would result in pro-development trade liberalization, 
ASEAN implemented the ASEAN Minus X modality in 2003.171  Two or more states could initiate 
negotiations and liberalize selected sectors, permitting other states to join subsequently. 172  
Different from the common sub-sector approach, the concessions would only be granted on a 
reciprocal basis so that the free rider problem could be eliminated.  Thus, ASEAN integration 
would not be dragged down to the pace of countries that were unwilling to cooperate and the 
benefits of liberalization could incentivize these states to make further commitments.173 
The year 2007 marked the adoption of the AEC Blueprint, a revolutionary change that 
envisioned a single market and production base by the end of 2015.174  The Blueprint mandated 
salient reforms to eliminate “substantially all restrictions on trade in services.” 175   The less 
sensitive Modes 1 and 2 were expected to be completely liberalized.176  Significantly, the AEC is 
                                                          
170 AFAS 3-6 followed the common sub-sector approach.  Id. 
171 Based on the Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (2003), Article IV bis (ASEAN 
Minus X modality) was added to the AFAS.  This modality can be traced back to the Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (2012).  SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 352. 
172 Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (2012), art. I:3. 
173 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 352-53. 
174 The AEC Blueprint has governed the negotiations of AFAS 7 and subsequent packages of commitments.  ASEAN 
Integration in Services (2013), at 19; Deunden Nikomborirak & Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, An Assessment of Services 
Sector Liberalization in ASEAN, in ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 
47, 53 (Sanchita Basu Das ed. 2013). 
175 For the actions of the AEC Blueprint, refer to Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26. 
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not modeled after the EU due to the limited liberalization scope of Modes 3 and 4, which face 
strong domestic protectionism.  The compromise on Mode 3 permits 70% rather than 100% of 
ASEAN equity participation. 177   Mode 4 concerns the increase of competition from foreign 
nationals.  The AEC framework is confined to the free flow of skilled labor to the exclusion of 
low-skilled and unskilled labor.178  Furthermore, the ASEAN Minus X formula continues to apply, 
and a 15% overall flexibility enables member states to carve out sensitive services industries from 
commitments.179 
These designs have formed a balance between the policy space and the regional integration 
under South-South FTAs.  Since 1995, successive AFAS packages of commitments have 
transformed from marginally to substantially GATS-plus.180  The level of services liberalization 
under ASEAN’s internal FTAs mutually reinforces the same under the region-based external FTAs.  
The interlocked mechanism secures the certainty of domestic reform and energizes deeper 
liberalization based on the threshold of the most recently concluded or updated commitments.  
Critically, the implicit mechanism consolidates South-South cooperation and revitalizes North-
South relations in line with development goals. 
The sequential approach also facilitates the extra-regionalization of ASEAN-centered 
regionalism that buttresses the bloc’s balance of power policy.  With the exception of the single 
undertaking approach of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, other ASEAN+1 FTAs allow 
essential components of FTAs to be separately concluded under a framework agreement.181  The 
                                                          
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 26-29. 
179 Id. at 26 & n.2. 
180  David Chin Soon Siong, ASEAN’s Journey towards Free Trade, in ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: ESSAYS AND 
REFLECTIONS BY SINGAPORE’S NEGOTIATIONS 209, 216 (C. L. Lim & Margaret Liang eds. 2011); ASEAN Integration 
Report 2015 (2015), at 29-30. 
181 ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 95-102. 
Pasha L. Hsieh 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, vol. 37 (forthcoming 2016-17) 
38 
 
model was based on the significant South-South trade pact, the ASEAN-China FTA, which was 
built upon agreements on goods, services, investment and the dispute settlement mechanism.182  
This FTA, which took eight years to complete, is critical to Beijing’s “One Belt One Road” 
initiative and ASEAN’s development target to attract FDI inflows.183 
With respect to services commitments, ASEAN FTAs with China and Korea adopted the 
AFAS-like package structure.184  While the first package under the ASEAN-China FTA contained 
rare “GATS-minus” commitments, the subsequent package remedied the situation by elevating the 
commitments to GATS-plus.185  ASEAN’s most recent breakthrough was the conclusion of a 
services agreement with India, which has been ultraconservative about service liberalization.186  
The fact that the liberalization level of the AFAS surpasses that of ASEAN+1 FTAs ensures the 
AEC’s integration and provides an impetus for RCEP and FTAAP liberalization.187  In turn, the 
economic growth led by services trade will revitalize developing countries’ external trade relations 
and reinforce the regional development objectives of the SDGs. 
B. Accelerating Cross-Border Labor Mobility 
Transnational labor mobility in services trade is a paramount development tool.  Going beyond 
the poverty reduction effect of remittances, circular migration brings back skills and experiences 
                                                          
182 ASEAN Economic Community Factbook (2011), at 81-82 
183 The ASEAN-China FTA began in 2002 and was finalized in 2010.  Id.; ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 
96; China to Align Belt and Road with ASEAN’s Development Strategies, XINHUA, Aug. 6, 2015, 
http://english.gov.cn/news/international_exchanges/2015/08/06/content_281475162278714.htm.  
184 Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Hikari Ishido, Assessing the Progress of Services Liberalization in the ASEAN-China Free 
Trade Area (ACFTA), ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2013), at 14. 
185 See id. at 3-17 (explaining the rationale for General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)-minus commitments 
and the comparison between two packages). 
186 Agreement on Trade in Services under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India (2014). 
187 For the FTAs’ various levels of services liberalization, see Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 184, at 7; Yoshifumi 
Fukunaga & Ikumo Isono, Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A Mapping Study, ERIA Discussion Paper 
Series (2013), at 16. 
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that benefit the economic development of the original countries.188  Nonetheless, allowing the 
entry of foreign nationals is among the most sensitive issues in international economic law because 
it is often perceived as opening the backdoor for immigration.  Not surprisingly, the WTO and 
FTA commitments to the temporary movement of natural persons (Mode 4) are far more restrictive 
than other modes of supply.189  For instance, in the face of congressional objections, Washington’s 
FTA policy turned conservative about Mode 4 commitments subsequent to the FTAs with Chile 
and Singapore.190  Similarly, the TPP provisions on the temporary entry of business persons are 
expected to be contested in the US Congress and other parliaments at the ratification stage.191 
For these reasons, ASEAN’s labor mobility exemplifies an NREO approach to cement the 
trade-development nexus through the liberalization of Mode 4 and benefit the SDG target of “full 
and productive employment.”192  Distinct from the EU’s freedom of movement, the AEC confines 
the free flow of labor to skilled workers in order to reconcile political resistance with economic 
integration.193  From a regional development perspective, the Mode 4 progress eases the shortage 
of professionals in more developed ASEAN countries.194   In addition, the liberalization will 
                                                          
188 Simon Feeny & Mark McGillivray, The Role of ASEAN Connectivity in Reducing the Development Gap, in 
NARROWING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP IN ASEAN: DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS 84, 113 (Mark McGillivray & David 
Carpenter eds. 2013); Regional Conference on Services Trade Liberalization and Labor Migration Policies in ASEAN: 
Towards the ASEAN Economic Community (2008), at 8. 
189 GATS, Mode 4 and the Pattern of Commitments: Background Information, Apr. 11-12, 2002, at 3; Presence of 
Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 25. 
190  Sherry Stephenson & Gary Hufbauer, Labor Mobility, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 275, 281-83 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds. 2011). 
191 See generally the Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), Ch. 12. 
192 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goal 8. 
193 The EU concept of freedom of movement, see the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (2012), art. 45. 
194 For example, Brunei and Thailand have faced a shortage of skilled labor in certain sectors.  Philip Martin & Manolo 
Abella, Reaping the Economic and Social Benefits of Labour Mobility: ASEAN 2015, ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper 
Series (2014), at 33; Labor Migration, Skills & Student Mobility in Asia (2014), at 31. 
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narrow the bloc’s development gap by allowing skilled workers in CLMV countries to increase 
their income by 14-20%.195 
Recognizing these pro-development benefits, ASEAN enacted treaties that underpin the 
AEC’s Mode 4 framework, which includes the ASEAN MNP Agreement and MRAs.  Mode 3 
obligations of commercial presence under the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement also 
complement the Mode 4 liberalization.  To facilitate ASEAN enterprises’ regional operation, the 
ACIA authorizes the entry, temporary stay and work of “investors, executives, managers and 
members of the board of directors” in member states.196 
Pursuant to the AEC Blueprint, the ASEAN MNP Agreement, which will supersede AFAS 
Mode 4 commitments, applies to skilled labor rather than all “natural persons.”197  It accelerates 
the movement of intra-corporate transferees, business visitors, contractual service suppliers and 
other professionals as defined in states’ schedules of commitments.198  Essentially, the agreement 
extends only to the service sector.199  For example, an intra-regional transfer of a Singapore-based 
sales manager of an agricultural or manufacturing plant in Myanmar falls outside the scope of the 
agreement, as neither agriculture nor manufacturing belongs to the service sector.  Nonetheless, 
the Singapore manager’s entry to other ASEAN countries for business trips is guaranteed under 
the ACIA, which covers “services incidental to” the non-service sectors.200 
                                                          
195 ASEAN Community 2015, supra note 146, at 72. 
196 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009) [ACIA], art. 22.  The preferential treatment under the 
ASEAN MNP Agreement applies to these key positions identified in the ACIA.  ASEAN MNP Agreement, art. 12:2. 
197 ASEAN MNP Agreement, preamble. 
198 Id. art. 2:1.  Intra-corporate transferees include executives, managers and specialists employed by companies. 
199 The Agreement stipulates that it covers persons engaged in trade in services, goods and investments, but none of 
the ASEAN countries made commitments in non-services sectors.  Id. preamble & art. 1(b); Yoshifumi Fukunaga & 
Hirari Ishido, Values and Limitations of the ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons, ERIA Discussion 
Paper Series (2015), at 5. 
200 ACIA, art. 3:3(f). 
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Akin to the GATS, the ASEAN MNP Agreement covers services provision on a non-
permanent basis, so that intra-regional labor mobility will not become a political immigration issue 
that impedes the development of South-South FTAs.  The agreement facilitates the “temporary” 
entry or stay of service providers. 201   Because of the ambiguity as to what length of time 
“temporary” entails, the commitments of ASEAN states vary largely across different categories of 
natural persons.202   The agreement explicitly excludes the governments’ “measures affecting 
natural persons seeking access to the employment market” and “measures regarding citizenship, 
residence or employment on a permanent basis.”203   ASEAN states are therefore allowed to 
maintain visa requirements for public purposes, provided that the benefits under the agreement are 
not nullified or impaired.204  The potential for skilled worker migration within ASEAN is arguably 
undermined because the agreement does not authorize the permanent entry of professionals.205 
In addition to the Mode 4 commitments under the ASEAN MNP Agreement, ASEAN’s MRAs 
facilitate the recognition of qualifications and advance intra-regional labor mobility.  As MRAs 
require significant changes in domestic rules allowing for foreign talents, they are outside of the 
WTO framework and are rarely addressed in FTAs. 206   ASEAN’s “à la carte” approach to 
profession-specific harmonization efforts signifies the implementation of regional law through a 
horizontal soft-law approach.  Unlike what the titles may suggest, MRAs do not accord direct 
recognition of licenses and certifications.207  Instead, they provide a scheme of cooperation based 
                                                          
201 ASEAN MNP Agreement, art. 2:1. 
202 The term “temporary” is negatively defined in the Agreement, based the model of the GATS Annex on Movement 
of Natural Persons Supplying Services.  See also Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190, at 276 (discussing the 
GATS approach).   
203 ASEAN MNP Agreement, art. 2:2. 
204 Id. art 2:3. 
205 ASEAN 2030, supra note 141, at 163. 
206 GATS only include loose requirements for mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) in Article VII. 
207 Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 20-21. 
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on member states’ respective agreements that harmonize the divergence of national legislation 
regulating various professions.208 
The effectiveness of MRAs is critical to ASEAN’s single market and its attractiveness for 
global professional firms.  Although the AEC Blueprint mandates that MRAs for all professional 
services be finalized by 2015, ASEAN has so far concluded MRAs for only eight professions.209  
The MRA “frameworks” on accountancy services and surveying services focus on identifying 
major principles and facilitating information exchanges.210  Their purpose is to build consensus for 
fully fledged MRAs that govern highly regulated professions in diverse jurisdictions.  For the other 
six professions, the implementation approaches vary across MRAs.  The MRAs on nursing 
services, medical practitioners and dental practitioners require a relatively simple process.  
Following certification by his or her country of origin, a medical doctor with sufficient 
qualification and without ethics violations may register as a foreign medical practitioner in the host 
country.211 
As “the most visible” MRAs, the agreements on engineering services and architectural services 
created regional bodies. 212   Under the regional public-private partnership, the ASEAN-level 
professional institutions and national regulatory bodies have established a three-step registration 
process.  For example, an engineer who meets the MRA’s educational and experience requirements 
should be first certified by the domestic regulatory body, which submits the application to the 
                                                          
208 AFAS, art. V. 
209 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26; ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 33. 
210 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement Framework on Accountancy Services (2009), art. 1; Chia Siow Yue, 
Free Flow of Skilled Labour in ASEAN, in ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND 
PERCEPTION 107, 118-19 (Sanchita Basu Das ed. 2013). 
211 ASEAN MRA on Medical Practitioners (2009), art. 3.1. 
212 ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 34.  The MRAs on engineering services and architectural services 
created the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer Coordinating Committee and the ASEAN Architecture Council, 
respectively. ASEAN MRA on Engineering Services (2005), art. 3.1; ASEAN MRA on Architectural Services (2007), 
art. 3.1. 
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ASEAN committee.213  After approval as an “ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer,” the 
engineer is eligible to apply to be a foreign engineer in another ASEAN state.214 
The most recent MRA on tourism professionals (MRA-TP) has important implications for 
development because tourism services are closely linked with GDP and employment in developing 
countries.215  Unique among ASEAN MRAs, the MRA-TP governs “unregulated” professions 
because no international standards exist for tourism services providers.216  The ASEAN experience 
sheds light on the impact of the legalization of tourism professionals.  The MRA-TP will advance 
the regional tourism industry by developing a common curriculum and competency standards for 
32 job titles, such as baker, laundry manager and travel consultant.217  It will also create a Web-
based database to assist registered tourism professionals in seeking employment in the bloc.218   
C. Regulatory Reform for the Post-2015 Agenda 
The emergence of the NREO in the context of Third Regionalism demonstrates how the rise 
of South-South FTAs deepens regional cooperation.  Having grasped the reality that the benefits 
of bargained concessions outweigh those of SDT measures, developing countries in the Asia-
                                                          
213 ASEAN MRA on Engineering Services (2005), art. 3. 
214 Id.; Deunden Nikomborirak & Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, ASEAN Trade in Services, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 95, 104-05 (Sanchita Basu Das ed. 2013).  As of 2015, there are 1,252 engineers 
and 284 architects on the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineers Register and ASEN Architect Register, 
respectively.  ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 34. 
215 The revenues for the tourism sector contribute to 10% of Cambodia’s GDP and 10% of employment in the 
Philippines.  Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Cambodia, Revision, WT/TPR/S/253/Rev.1, Nov. 24, 
2011, at 79; Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, the Philippines, Revision, WT/TPR/S/261/Rev.2, May 9, 
2012, at 93. 
216 Note that in some ASEAN countries, tour guides are subject to regulatory requirements and therefore they are not 
covered under the MRA.  Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Assessing the Progress of ASEAM MRAs on Professional Services, 
ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2015), at 26. 
217 A person who possesses a tourism certificate issued by a national agency in compliance with MRA requirements 
can be recognized as a “Foreign Tourism Professional” in another ASEAN state.  ASEAN MRA on Tourism 
Professionals, arts. II-III; ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Tourism Professionals (MRA) – Handbook 
(2013) [MRA-TP Handbook], at 18. 
218 Id. at 45-46. 
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Pacific have switched to a neo-liberal approach to international economic law.  South-based 
regionalism provides these countries with a safe “playing ground” for trade liberalization.  
Moreover, the Doha Development Agenda stresses aid for trade to help LDCs. 219   The Bali 
package offers LDCs additional waivers and preferential market access as a pro-development 
policy. 220   Ironically, these measures rarely necessitate domestic reform that energizes 
development.  The NREO approach provides a different path.  ASEAN-based regionalism has 
incentivized CLMV countries to pursue market reform that resulted in noteworthy growth.  As part 
of the bloc, these LDCs benefit from the augmented negotiating power in extra-regional FTAs.  
The AEC integration also prevents the negative consequence of trade diversion.221   
Built on the original AEC Blueprint, the creation of the AEC in 2015 prompted the adoption 
of the AEC Blueprint 2025 with the goal of further transforming the bloc to a unified economy 
that is “highly integrated and cohesive” and focuses on “sustainable economic development.”222  
In particular, services liberalization indicates ASEAN’s legalization of trade-development policy 
in line with the SDGs.  Nevertheless, it should be cautioned that the AEC should be seen as an 
impetus for the evolving process.  To buttress the NREO argument for the benefits of the Global 
South, I offer the following regulatory reform proposals in ASEAN’s post-2015 agenda. 
1. Operationalizing Development Assistance 
Operationalizing ASEAN’s development assistance is integral to the services trade-oriented 
development policy and provides a model for South-centered regionalism.  The two-tiered ASEAN 
problem due to member states’ economic divergences has posed formidable obstacles to the AEC’s 
                                                          
219 The WTO at Twenty: Challenges and Achievements (2015), at 32-33. 
220 Id. 
221 See Cooper, supra note 75, at 11 (explaining the economic impact of the FTAs). 
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goal of realizing a single market and production base.  As a form of development assistance, the 
IAI work plans are intertwined with narrowing the development gap and poverty reduction 
efforts.223  For instance, Singapore offers training on IT and tourism through its centers in CLMV 
countries and promotes the liberalization of these LDCs’ trade in services. 224   Yet, the 
effectiveness of fragmented IAI programs has been questionable.225   
To offer WTO-plus development assistance, it is imperative to consolidate multilateral 
harmonization and cooperation according to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 226  
Decreasing the transaction costs of IAI programs and providing need-based advisory assistance 
will strengthen the services trade-oriented strategy.  An important approach is to incorporate the 
principle of ASEAN centrality by aligning development aids rendered by intra-regional and extra-
regional countries.  The integrated measures will in turn achieve the SDGs’ objective of 
revitalizing global partnership by fortifying “North-South, South-South and triangular 
cooperation.”227 
In truth, geopolitical considerations underpin respective countries’ official development 
assistance (ODA) policies, which are linked to the implementation of FTAs and IAI efforts.  
Chinese foreign assistance enforces Xi Jinping’s diplomatic priority over the periphery countries 
                                                          
223 ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 80-81; Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 96-
106. 
224 David Carpenter et al., Regional Development Cooperation and Narrowing the Development Gap in AESAN, in 
NARROWING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP IN ASEAN: DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS 135, 166 (Mark McGillivray & 
David Carpenter eds. 2013); Overview, http://www.scp.gov.sg/content/scp/about_us/introduction.html (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2015).  Under the Initiative for AESAN Integration (IAI), Singapore is the largest donor among ASEAN-6 
countries.  Id. at 164-65.  Also note that IAI work plans focus primarily on soft infrastructure.  ASEAN Economic 
Community Factbook (2011), at 78. 
225 Helen E.S. Nesadurai, Enhancing the Institutional Framework for AEC Implementation: Designing Institutions 
that Are Effective and Politically Feasible, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 411, 421 
(Sanchita Basu Das et al. eds. 2013); Vo Tri Thanh, ASEAN Economic Community: Perspective from ASEAN’s 
Transitional Economies, in ROADMAP TO AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 105, 116 (Denis Hew ed. 2005). 
226  See GOLDIN & REINERT, supra note 147, 124 (indicating the Paris Declaration principles as “ownership, 
harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability”). 
227 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goal 17. 
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as an approach to increase Beijing’s bargaining power to formulate the “new type of great power 
relations” with Washington.228  The Chinese characteristics of South-South cooperation have 
traditionally emphasized concessional loans for infrastructure building to facilitate the export of 
Chinese capital and labor.229  The private equity fund created under the ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank exemplify the practice.230 
The training of foreign officials in China also demonstrates a new trend of “soft” development 
assistance to export the Chinese development model.231  Moreover, as the ASEAN-China FTA 
indicates, the geographic hub of Chinese aid is the Mekong River basin, which covers CLMV 
countries that are ideologically akin to China.232  The Chinese economic influence over Cambodia 
is most noteworthy, as it prompted Phnom Penh to side with Beijing in conflict with ASEAN 
claimant states in the South China Sea disputes.233 
Similar to China’s focus on Southeast Asia, the Abe Doctrine of Japan drove the country to be 
the largest external donor to the IAI programs. 234   Whereas the Fukuda Doctrine built the 
foundation of ASEAN-Japan relations in the 1970s, the Abe administration considers its ODA 
from the national security viewpoint.235  The purpose of Tokyo’s assertive strategy is to provide a 
                                                          
228 Timothy Heath, China’s Big Diplomacy Shift, DIPLOMAT, Dec. 22, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/chinas-
big-diplomacy-shift/; Dingding Chen, Defining a “New Type of Major Power Relations,” DIPLOMAT, Dec. 8, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-type-of-major-power-relations/.  
229 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid (2014), at 2-8. 
230 China’s Foreign Assistance in Review: Implications for the United States, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission Research Backgrounder (2011), at 13; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of 
Agreement (2015), arts. 1-2.  
231 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid (2014), at 4-5. 
232 ASEAN-China Framework Agreement, supra note 132, art 7:1(e). 
233 Cambodia’s pro-Beijing policy has impaired the common position of ASEAN on South China Sea disputes.  Kong 
Sothanarith, Cambodia Publicly Endorses China Position on South China Sea, VOICE OF AM., Mar. 25, 2015, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/cambodia-publicly-endorses-china-position-on-south-china-sea/2694301.html.  
234 Carpenter, supra note 224, at 160-64; Narushige Michishita, Shinzo Abe: Abe Doctrine to Remake Japan-Asean 
Relations, STRAIT TIMES, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/shinzo-abe-abe-doctrine-to-remake-japan-
asean-relations.   
235 For the origin and core principles of the Fukuda Doctrine, see SUEO SUDO, JAPAN’S ASEAN POLICY: IN SEARCH 
OF PROACTIVE MULTILATERALISM 69-75 (2015). 
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counter balance to China and strengthen the US-Japan alliance, as well as consolidate Japanese 
enterprises’ regional supply chains.  The ASEAN-Japan FTA encompasses areas of economic 
cooperation in terms of business environment, intellectual property, and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).236  Japan’s innovative development initiative includes the technical assistance 
of drafting Myanmar’s Securities Exchange Law, which facilitates the entrance of Japanese 
enterprises and law firms into emerging markets.237 
The conventional “North” also provides noteworthy development assistance.  Obama’s “pivot 
to Asia” policy and anti-terrorism strategy form the basis of the ASEAN-US Strategic Partnership, 
which strengthens US aid in trade facilitation, investment and SMEs.238  To expand ties with Asia, 
the EU also implements programs to enhance ASEAN’s FTA negotiation capacity and the 
operations of the ASEAN Secretariat.239  The United States and the EU are ASEAN’s dialogue 
partners, but they have yet to conclude region-based FTAs with ASEAN.240  Among ASEAN’s 
external FTAs, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA has the most detailed economic 
cooperation mechanism that directly contributes to ASEAN’s integrated services market.  Under 
the auspices of the FTA, the ASEAN Qualifications Referencing Framework, which harmonizes 
legal differences, advances the bloc’s Mode 4 liberalization and MRAs.241 
                                                          
236 Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and Japan (2008), art. 53. 
237 Nam Pan, Japanese ODA to Asian Countries: “An Empirical Study of Myanmar Compared with Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam” (2014), at 38. 
238  See generally Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership, Nov. 21, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/21/joint-statement-asean-us-strategic-partnership; Activity 
Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Connectivity through Trade and Investment (ACTI) (2015). 
239 EU-ASEAN: Natural Partners (7th ed. 2013), at 7-8; Carpenter, supra note 224, at 160-62. 
240 ASEAN’s dialogue partners include non-FTA partners such as the United States, Russia and the EU.  ASEAN 
Dialogue Coordinatorship, http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-dialogue-coordinator (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2015). 
241 Implementing Arrangement for the ASEAN-Australia-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area Economic Co-
Operation Work Programme Pursuant to Chapter 12 (Economic Co-Operation) of the Agreement Establishing the 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (2009), at 12. 
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Multilateral development assistance associated with the changing nature of North-South 
relations benefits ASEAN in the multi-polar economic structure and affirms the NREO 
assumptions based on realism and the new dependency theory.  Nevertheless, countries’ “unilateral 
adoption” of IAI projects galvanized by divergent geopolitical goals runs the risk of undermining 
ASEAN’s integration and the IAI’s effectiveness.  In practice, leaders of projects from donor 
countries have conducted only informal meetings for information exchange without substantive 
coordination to reduce overlapping programs.242 
To implement the Paris Declaration principles, ASEAN should formalize development 
assistance coordination under the FTA framework.  Some may contend that the development 
chapter of the TPP will fill the gap of coordination.  I disagree with this contention.  Although 
more ASEAN countries are considering joining the TPP, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are 
unlikely to join the pact due to its high standards.243  The danger of being “left out” for these LDC 
countries is counteractive to the AEC’s objective to narrow the development gap. 
Importantly, the development needs of developing countries in the TPP, such as Chile, Mexico 
and Peru, are different from those of ASEAN.  The TPP may have a negative “development 
assistance diversion” effect on the ASEAN states.  Under Article 23, the TPP expects to establish 
a Committee of Development to implement assistance programs.244  While such an FTA design 
should be acknowledged, the TPP Committee lacks the institutional memory concerning ASEAN 
IAI projects.  Also, the TPP provisions address neither a monitoring mechanism nor resource 
                                                          
242 Evaluation of EC Co-Cooperation with ASEAN (2009), vol. 2, at 96-97.  
243 As of December 2015, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand indicated their intentions to join the TPP.  Prashanth 
Parameswaran, Indonesia Wants to Join TPP: President Jokowi, DIPLOMAt, Oct. 27, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/indonesia-wants-to-join-tpp-jokowi/.  
244 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), art. 23.7. 
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mobilization, which relates to the fundamental question of “where money comes from.”  The 
additional ODA budget may further delay the ratification of the TPP in developed countries. 
The proposed NREO approach to development assistance is distinguishable from the NIEO, 
which demanded overall redistributive justice in international economic law without taking the 
North-South political reality into account.  The NREO proposes to translate fragmented, 
geopolitical interest-motivated development assistance projects into an integrated, law-based 
mechanism centered on the South.  To operationalize development provisions under the mandate 
of the ASEAN Blueprint 2025, the effective coordination of development assistance should be 
integrated into the implementation of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the prospective RCEP.245  It is for the 
ASEAN Secretariat to formalize the consultative mechanism between ASEAN states and foreign 
donor countries. 
To accurately address the needs of CLMV countries, the Secretariat is advised to enforce 
monitoring and evaluation of development assistance projects.246  Based on lessons learned from 
the WTO Enhanced Integrated Framework for Aid for Trade, a trust fund coming from the existing 
budget of ASEAN partners can be created.247  The fund will ensure the independence of projects 
and enhance the ASEAN Secretariat’s capacity to mobilize resources by aligning IAI work plans 
with AEC goals and the SDGs.  These mechanisms provide a new catalyst for operationalizing 
development assistance under the FTA architecture. 
                                                          
245 The scope of my proposal is larger than that of proposal for the Initiative for East Asian Integration.  Vo Tri Thanh, 
Effectiveness of Initiative for ASEAN Integration, in ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE 
AND PERCEPTION 183, 200 (Sanchita Basu Das ed. 2013); ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 
34-25. 
246 FTA provisions should transform current ASEAN guidelines that “encourage” monitoring and evaluation to a 
binding nature.  Guidelines for IAI Projects: For ASEAN Dialogue Partners and External Parties (2013), at Sec. III; 
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 37. 
247 For the introduction to the WTO Enhanced Integrated Framework and its predecessor, the Integrated Framework, 
see The WTO at Twenty: Challenges and Achievements (2015), at 74. 
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2. Removing Regulatory Trade Barriers 
Effective development assistance will positively impact services trade-oriented development 
and benefit the SDGs to end poverty, promote economic growth and employment, and reduce the 
inequality among nations. 248   Nonetheless, a prerequisite to this projection is regionalism-
promoted reform that removes regulatory trade barriers in domestic law.  In other words, services 
commitments under FTAs work for development if they are based on de jure and de facto 
implementation.  To provide a model for South-South FTAs, ASEAN states should undergo further 
reform on the negotiation modality and domestic regulations. 
The structural improvements to ASEAN’s liberalization of trade in services need to be 
prioritized in its post-2015 agenda.  First, the immediate priority is to enact the ATISA, which 
consolidates various services commitments in the general AFAS packages, sector-specific 
packages, and the ASEAN MNP Agreement.249  The incremental liberalization approach is at the 
point where a single schedule of commitments will further transparency and integration.  The 
ATISA should also strengthen its linkage with the ACIA’s Mode 3 commitments to prevent Mode 
4 restrictions from obstructing the commercial presence of ASEAN enterprises.250 
Second, AFAS commitments have been negotiated under the positive list modality.  Switching 
the negotiation mode to the more aggressive negative list approach will effectively cover newly 
developed services and enhance transparency.251  This approach will also solidify intra-ASEAN 
                                                          
248 See generally Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goals 1, 8 and 10. 
249 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 6. 
250 See Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 31 (explaining the risk of disconnections between Modes 3 and 4 in 
ASEAN services commitments). 
251 Christopher Findlay, Services Trade Liberalization in ASEAN, in ROADMAP TO AN ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
172, 186-87 (Denis Hew 2005); Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvé, Services, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT 
POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 235, 251-52 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds. 2011). 
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supply chains and avoid the TPP’s potential trade diversion effect, which would undermine the 
AEC integration.  Except for Singapore’s hybrid approach to services commitments, ASEAN 
countries are in favor of the positive list approach to retain their regulatory space to protect infant 
industries.252  Nevertheless, an inventive design is embedded in the Malaysia-New Zealand FTA, 
which currently lists services commitments on a positive list basis.253  In the FTA, Malaysia agreed 
to “commence re-negotiation of the specific commitments” if it concludes an agreement on a 
negative list with a third country. 254   This forward-looking MFN mechanism should be 
multilateralized to the AEC and the RCEP to trigger progressive liberalization.   
Third, the AEC allows the ASEAN Minus X formula and the 15% flexibility rule in services 
trade liberalization.255   These politically-oriented principles were designed to abate domestic 
protectionism and to stimulate the initial liberalization under the South-South FTA.  In reality, 
neither principle is clear.  The ASEAN Minus X formula leads to fragmented commitments at 
different speeds.  It is unclear whether a state can opt out of the commitments to which it first 
agreed if it is unable to meet the commitments in the implementation stage.256  Furthermore, no 
ASEAN agreements elaborate principles governing the 15% flexibility proviso, thus making it 
difficult to comprehend whether and how countries should schedule their services commitments 
                                                          
252 For example, Singapore followed the positive list approach in the Singapore-China FTA, but adopted the negative 
list approach in the Singapore-Peru FTA.  Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Singapore, Revision, 
WT/TPR/S/267/Rev.1, Oct. 18, 2012, at 56.  Other ASEAN states, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, scheduled their 
services commitments under FTAs predominantly on a positive list basis.  Trade Policy Review, Report by the 
Secretariat, Malaysia, WT/TPR/S/292, Jan. 27, 2014 [Trade Policy Review, Malaysia], at 104; Trade Policy Review, 
Report by the Secretariat, Indonesia, WT/TPR/S/278, Mar. 6, 2013, at 84 & 109-10. 
253 Trade Policy Review, Malaysia, supra note 252, at 32 & 104. 
254 See Malaysia-New Zealand FTA (2009), art. 8.15(2) (“The re-negotiation shall proceed on a ‘negative list’ basis.  
The Parties shall endeavour to conclude the re-negotiation on the specific commitments within 18 months from the 
date the negotiations commence.”). 
255 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26. 
256 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 352-53; Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 174, at 59-60. 
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based on the rule.  To maximize the pro-development effect, it is pivotal to narrowly construe these 
SDT-like exceptions and base the intra-regional Grand Bargain on objective criteria.  
Lastly, the AEC’s single market depends on the further liberalization of Modes 3 and 4.  
Different from the EU’s top-down approach, ASEAN’s FTA-plus path provides an optional model 
for the South.  The salient issue for commercial presence negotiations is the AEC’s 70% ASEAN 
equity participation rule.257  While some member states have unilaterally increased the foreign 
equity threshold to 100%, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have yet to meet the AEC 
target.258  A priority for AFAS negotiations is to minimize limitations of market access and 
national treatment for Mode 3, so that domestic regulation will not cripple the effectiveness of 
ASEAN equity commitments.259 
The Mode 4 liberalization that facilitates cross-border labor mobility has great potential for 
development due to the effect of remittances and skill transfer.  At the WTO, most Mode 4 
horizontal commitments are related to intra-corporate transferees and business visitors, and labor 
mobility is thus intertwined with commercial presence.260  Delinking the Mode 4 commitments 
under the ASEAN MNP Agreement with Mode 3 will create more opportunities for independent 
professionals.261  Another required improvement lies in ASEAN states’ commitments regarding 
                                                          
257 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26.  Note that the AEC Blueprint only mandates “[n]o 
restrictions for Modes 1 and 2.”  Id. 
258 Sirisena Dahanayake, Implications of Liberalizing Professional Services: Legal, Accountancy, and Engineering 
Services in Lai PDR (2012), at 12; Dionisius Narjoko, AEC Blueprint Implementation Performance and Challenges: 
Services Liberalization, ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2015), at 14. 
259 Philippa Dee, Does AFAS Have Bite? Comparing Commitments with Actual Practice (2013), at 21.   
260 64.1% of Mode 4 entries in GATS schedules are related to intra-corporate transferees and business visitors.  
Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 21.  The Mode 4 commitments under the ASEAN MNP 
Agreement follow the same trend.  Sarah Huelser & Adam Heal, Moving Freely? Labour Mobility in ASEAN, ASIA-
PACIFIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING NETWORK ON TRADE POLICY BRIEF, No. 40 (2014), at 4; Flavia Jurie & Sandra 
Lavenex, ASEAN Economic Community: What Model for Labour Mobility? NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper, 
No. 2015/02 (2015), at 4. 
261 In comparison, the TPP mandates that the cross-border supply of a service not be conditioned on “a representative 
office or any form of enterprise.” The Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), art. 10.6. 
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the periods of stay for natural persons under the agreement, which should be substantially GATS-
plus.262 
The implicit interlocked mechanism between ASEAN intra-regional and extra-regional FTAs 
has prompted states to use a higher threshold for negotiations, thus making these FTAs “living” 
documents and ensuring the AEC’s integration and its impact on Asia-Pacific regionalism.263  The 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, which contains a separate chapter on the MNP, has the 
strongest GATS-plus services commitments among the ASEAN+1 FTAs.264  The inclusion of the 
MNP annex in the recent ASEAN-India Agreement on Trade in Services also indicates the 
direction of the RCEP towards labor mobility.265  The enhanced liberalization of Modes 3 and 4 
will strengthen ASEAN’s strategy of services trade-oriented development. 
3. Transnational Legal Harmonization and Human Rights Protection 
Given the crisis of the Doha Round when it came to realizing the development promises, the 
creation of the AEC illustrates an NREO approach to South-South cooperation and offers an 
alternative for trade-led development.  In ASEAN’s post-2015 agenda, the bloc should streamline 
WTO-plus matters with FTA policy.  To maximize the development effect, ASEAN should 
promote the regional legal harmonization of mutual recognition and immigration rules and the 
                                                          
262 Under the GATS, “while business visitors are generally allowed to stay up to 90 days, the presence of intra-
corporate transferees . . . tends to be limited to periods of between two and five years.”  Presence of Natural Persons 
(Mode 4), S/C/W/75, Dec. 8. 1998, at 1 & 28.  In ASEAN, business visitors are allowed to stay in the host country 
from 30 to 90 days and the duration of stay for intra-corporate transferees ranges between one month and three years.  
Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 8-9. 
263 This approach reflects the practice of AFAS and ASEAN+1 services negotiations. 
264 Razeen Sally, ASEAN FTAs: State of Play and Outlook for ASEAN’s Regional and Global Integration, IN THE 
ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 320, 363 (Sanchita Basu Das et al. eds. 2013); Agreement 
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (2009), Ch. 9.  Note that the ASEAN-Japan FTA 
lacks services commitments.  
265 Agreement on Trade in Services under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India (2014), Annex on Movement of Natural 
Persons. 
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legalization of human rights based on international labor law.  This approach will hence extend 
the implementation of the SDGs from trade-led economic benefits to the protection of labor rights 
and fundamental freedoms.266 
ASEAN’s skilled labor-focused policy is applied through Mode 4 commitments and the MRAs.  
Falling short of the AEC goal to finalize MRAs for all professional services by 2015, the eight 
current MRAs cover less than 2% of ASEAN’s workforce.267  In practice, the MRA provisions 
that mandate minimum years of experience have restricted the number of eligible professionals.268  
Even meeting the MRA criteria does not guarantee employment due to states’ additional 
requirements.  Consequently, there is a gap between regional harmonization and domestic law. 
A common obstacle is the labor market test.  For instance, a Malaysian company seeking to 
recruit a foreign engineer bears the burden of proving the absence of local engineers for the specific 
project.269   Limitations on nationality, residency restrictions and language requirements pose 
additional challenges.270  While Thai law accepts foreign nurses, none have been admitted because 
the licensing examination is conducted in Thai.271  Arguably, the implementation problem also 
exists in bilateral FTAs.  Japan’s FTAs with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam accept 
ASEAN nurses.272  The statistics show that only three ASEAN nurses passed Japan’s nursing 
                                                          
266 E.g., Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goals 8.5., 8.8 and 16.10. 
267 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26; Guntur Sugiyarto & Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, 
A ‘Freer’ Flow of Skilled Labour within ASEAN: Aspirations, Opportunities and Challenges in 2015 and Beyond, 
IOM-MPI Issues in Brief, No. 11 (2014), at 1.  See ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 11 
(ASEAN should “[e]xpand and deepen commitments under the ASEAN Agreement on MNP where appropriate . . . .”). 
268 The required length of experience ranges from three to ten years.  Sugiyarto & Agunias, supra note 267, at 3. 
269  Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 214, at 130.  The Philippines also imposes the labor market test 
requirement for foreign nationals in its Labor Code.  Rafaelita M. Aldaba, ASEAN Economic Community 2015: Labor 
Mobility and Mutual Recognition Arrangements on Professional Services, Discussion paper Series, No. 2013-04 
(2013), at 4-5. 
270 See Aldaba, supra note 269, at 3-4 (explaining that the Philippines’ Constitutional and the Foreign Investment Act 
requirements); Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 214, at 130 (stating that a foreign architect must reside in 
Malaysia for 180 days in a year). 
271 Fukunaga, supra note 216, 20-21. 
272  See Ch. 3: Movement of Natural Persons, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/2010WTO/3-
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examination in 2015, which is necessary for long-term residence.273  These de jure and de facto 
restrictions constrain the development potential for regional labor mobility. 
Mutual recognition is among the most difficult FTA issues.  Even the US-led TPP simply 
follows the GATS model by encouraging a member state to “afford adequate opportunity to 
another” partner for negotiating an MRA, which should be conducted in a non-discriminatory 
manner.274  In contrast with the TPP’s nascent stage of development, the AEC framework has 
accumulated ten years of experience in implementing regional MRAs.275  ASEAN MRAs possess 
the potential to provide a model for South-South FTAs that energize mutual recognition schemes 
in Asia-Pacific FTAs such as the RCEP and the FTAAP, which cover countries at diverse stages 
of development. 
To remedy the current weaknesses, ASEAN countries should intensify the legal harmonization 
of domestic rules.  Based on common criteria, states should narrowly apply the MRAs’ “subject 
to domestic laws and regulations” provisions and to enlarge the right of independent practice for 
professionals.276  To ensure regional integration, states are obliged to increase the distinction 
between ASEAN and other foreign professionals by according the former more preferential 
treatment.277  
                                                          
3Movement.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2015), at 775-81 (comparing Mode 4 commitments in Japan’s FTAs with seven 
Southeast Asian countries). 
273  The Results of the National Nursing Exam for EPA-based Nurse Candidates (Past Seven Years), 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-10805000-Iseikyoku-Kangoka/0000079084.pdf (in Japanese) (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2015).   
274 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), art. 10.9; General Agreement on Trade in Services (1994), art. VII. 
275 The first ASEAN MRA, which governs on Engineering Services, was concluded in 2005.  See also ASEAN 
Services Integration Report (2015), at 34 (“To date, there are a total of 1,252 engineers on the ASEAN Chartered 
Professional Engineers Register . . . .”). 
276  E.g., ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Nursing Services (2006), arts. 3.2; ASEAN MRA on 
Engineering Services (2005), art. 3.3.  See Fukunaga, supra note 216, at 16 (stating that unlike the EU, “[t]he ASEAN 
MRA in principle does not give a right for independent practice.  Actually, Viet Nam is the only ASEAN country that 
allows independent practice.”). 
277 See id. at 21 (observing that most ASEAN states “do not distinguish ASEAN and non-ASEAN in their respective 
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The legal harmonization process that will prompt the paradigm shift in Asia-Pacific 
regionalism is expected to link immigration rules to Mode 4 commitments and MRAs.  The 
schemes under the EU and the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement between Australia and New 
Zealand allow freedom of movement for work purposes.278  The development gap and concerns of 
illegal immigration make visa-free mechanisms infeasible for ASEAN.  Significantly, 19 APEC 
members, including seven ASEAN states, participate in the APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC) 
scheme, which permits pre-cleared business travelers short-term entry.279  The three-year valid 
ABTC also allows holders to use the express APEC lane at ports of entry, thus cutting time spent 
at immigration checkpoints by 52.4%.280 
While the transplantation of the APEC-like “ASEAN lane” at customs will improve labor 
mobility, the region can benefit more from a visa system that extends beyond the temporary stay 
for business visitors.  The AEC Blueprint’s implementation of facilitating “the issuance of visas 
and employment passes for ASEAN professionals” can be modeled after the NAFTA and the US 
FTA with Singapore.281  The “Trade NAFTA” visa (known as the TN visa) for Canadians and 
Mexicans ties US employment with renewable visas.282  The US-Singapore FTA created separate 
quotas for US H-1B work visas allocated to Singaporean nationals.283  Based on these models, it 
                                                          
regulatory frameworks”). 
278 For the introduction to the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, see Labor Migration, Skills & Student Mobility in 
Asia (2014), at 37. 
279 Among the 21 APEC economies, only Canada and the United States are transitional members and have not yet 
joined the scheme.  APEC Business Travel Card, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Business-
Resources/APEC-Business-Travel-Card.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
280 APEC’s Achievements in Trade Facilitation in 2007-2010: Final Assessment of the Second Trade Facilitation 
Action (TFAP II) (2012), at 1. 
281 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 29. 
282 See Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190, at 281 (“When proof of a job offer is demonstrated, the TN visa 
permits employment for one year, with unlimited renewal.”); Philip Martin & Manolo Abella, supra note 194, at 13 
(“There has never been a quota on the number of TN visas available for Canadian, but there was a 5,500 a year quota 
on TN visas available for Mexicans between 1994 and 2005.”). 
283 See USTR on Professional Workers in Chile, Singapore FTAs, July 23, 2003, 
http://singapore.usembassy.gov/072303a.html (stating that under the FTA, the number of Singaporean professionals 
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is recommended that ASEAN design a pan-ASEAN professional visa scheme that allocates the 
visa quotes subject to negotiations.  The scheme will harmonize domestic immigration rules and 
deepen the implementation of Mode 4 commitments and MRAs. 
Other than the legal harmonization efforts, ASEAN’s breakthrough in Asia-Pacific FTAs lies 
in facilitating and managing the flow of migrant workers in the post-2015 agenda.  The AEC has 
liberalized the movement of professionals.  The legitimacy of the services trade-oriented 
development policy requires the expansion of “beneficiaries” of the regional integration by 
incorporating low-skilled labor.  As in other regions, a political paradox has often arisen from the 
struggle between resistance to migrant workers and the shortage of labor undertaking the 3D (dirty, 
dangerous and demanding) jobs necessary for the economic development.284 
From the legal perspective, the ASEAN Charter that legalizes the AEC does not exclude low-
skilled labor from ASEAN’s single market.285  The current skilled labor-centered scheme is not 
sustainable because it ignores the reality that more than 87% of intra-ASEAN workers are semi-
skilled or unskilled.286  More fundamentally, facilitating the temporary movement of migrant 
workers will yield “the greatest absolute and poverty-related gains for developing countries” and 
reduce ASEAN’s development gap.287  Given the estimated increase of low-skilled occupations 
by 62.4% and the urgent labor shortage problem, it is timely to construct a mechanism to manage 
the flow of migrant workers based on the best practices of FTAs.288 
                                                          
in the United States is limited to 5,400). 
284 See Jason Ng, Richer Asean Nations Resist Opening Doors to Migrant Workers, WALL STREET J., Apr. 3, 2013, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323646604578402283145126480 (discussing the situations in 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand). 
285 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007), art. 1:5. 
286 Sugiyarto & Agunias, supra note 267, at 4. 
287 Abrenica, supra note 144, at 354; Feeny & McGillivray, supra note 188, at 117. 
288 Laura Brewer, Labour Mobility and Skills Recognition: Lessons for ASEAN, PowerPoint Slides (2014), at 6; 
Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 31; Labor Migration, Skills & Student Mobility in Asia (2014), at 42. 
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Markedly, the human rights dimension of the SDGs can also be implemented through the labor 
rights protection under the AEC framework.  As merely 17% of GATS entries encompass low-
skilled workers, ASEAN’s WTO-plus mechanism will provide a new trade-development 
paradigm. 289   Labor commitments are stressed in the IAI, the ASEAN Declaration on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, and the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. 290   However, the economic aim and human rights aspirations are disconnected.  
Although the two declarations identify the obligations of states, their soft-law nature and the 
absence of an enforcement mechanism limit their practical value. 
As an effective approach to labor protection, ASEAN countries have concluded bilateral labor 
agreements (BLAs) or memoranda of understanding that incorporate paramount principles of 
International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.291  Presumably, the BLAs that provide for 
the movement of low-skilled labor have circumvented the MFN effect of the GATS and led to a 
different type of the “noodle bowl” effect. 292   Some may argue that domestic labor law 
enforcement suffices to achieve the goal.  This argument neglects the practice of excluding certain 
categories of labor, such as domestic maids, from employment legislation and the work injury 
compensation scheme.293  Despite domestic courts’ recognition of “a matter of public interest,” 
                                                          
289 See Arti Grover Goswami & Sebastián Sáez, How Well Have Trade Agreements Facilitated Temporary Mobility, 
in LET WORKERS MOVE: USING BILATERAL LABOR AGREEMENTS TO INCREASE TRADE IN SERVICES 17, 25 (Sebastián 
Sáez ed. 2013) (explaining the scope of Mode 4 commitments under the GATS). 
290 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 107; ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2007); ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2012), para. 27. 
291 E.g., Memorandum of Understanding between Trade Unions in Cambodia and Trade Unions in Thailand on 
Protection of Migrant Workers’ Rights (2013); Labor Migration, Skills & Student Mobility in Asia (2014), at 43. 
292 The feature of Asian noodle bowl or spaghetti bowl commonly refers to fragmented rules of origin under FTAs.  
For an analysis if the bilateral labor agreements’ potential violation of the most-favored-nation clause of the GATS, 
see Arti Grover Goswami et al., When and Why Should Bilateral Labor Agreements be Used, in LET WORKERS MOVE: 
USING BILATERAL LABOR AGREEMENTS TO INCREASE TRADE IN SERVICES 39, 45-46 (Sebastián Sáez ed. 2013); 
Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190, at 290. 
293  For instance, “domestic workers” are excluded from Singapore’s Employment Act and the Work Injury 
Compensation Act.  Employment Act (Ch. 91), art. 2(1); Work Injury Compensation Act (Ch. 354), Fourth Schedule: 
Classes of Persons Not Covered. 
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the vulnerable status of foreign workers has contributed to prevalent incidents of labor abuses in 
the region.294 
While it is not unique for South-South FTAs to include labor cooperation, the challenge is to 
make such cooperation operative by balancing the economic need and human rights protection.295  
ASEAN can demonstrate the best practices for the NREO approach by incorporating labor 
commitments into the multilateral AEC and RCEP frameworks.  Richer ASEAN countries’ 
resistance to labor provisions cannot stand, as they are committed to the TPP’s labor protection 
modeled after US FTAs.296 
For development purposes, the AEC should oblige states to enforce ASEAN Declarations in 
domestic laws.  The 1998 ILO Declaration, based on eight key conventions, requires states’ 
compliance with fundamental labor principles. 297   These principles, incorporated in ASEAN 
Declarations, include freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the prohibition 
of forced labor, child labor and discrimination in employment.298  Nonetheless, only Cambodia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines ratified all of the fundamental ILO conventions. 299   The 
                                                          
294 E.g., ADG v. Public Prosecutor & Other Appeal, [2010] 1 SLR 874, 897, para. 55.  See also Maid to Order: Ending 
Abuses against Migrant Domestic Workers in Singapore, 17: 10(c) HUM. RTS. WATCH 1, 1 (2005) (“Between 1999 
and 2005, at least 147 migrant domestic workers died from workplace accidents or suicide, most by jumping or falling 
from residential buildings.”); Trinna Leong, ‘Forced labor’ Rife in Malaysian Electronics Factories: Report, REUTERS, 
Sept. 17, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-labour-report-idUSKBN0HC08E20140917 (“One in five 
immigrants were working more than the suggested 60 hours of overtime a week . . . .”). 
295 E.g. Free Trade Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Chile 
(2005), art. 108. 
296 These countries include Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia.  For labor enforcement issues, see The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (2015), Ch. 19; Mary Jane Bolle, Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues in Free Trade Agreements, 
Congressional Research Service Report (2014), at 4-6.   
297 The Declaration requires all International Labour Organization (ILO) members, “even if they have not ratified the 
Conventions in question,” to comply with four core labor principles.  1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work (1998), art. 2.  
298 Id.; ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2007), Obligations of 
Receiving States; ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2012), paras. 3, 6 and 27. 
299 For ASEAN’s countries’ ratification status in the eight ILO conventions, see Martin & Abella, supra note 194, at 
28. 
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transformation of regional commitments into domestic legislation will elevate human rights 
protection and complement the overall development of the ASEAN Community. 
Built on the best practices of the BLAs, the multilateral labor cooperation under the AEC is 
advised to strengthen the public-private partnership to allocate visa quotas, streamline the 
recruitment process and ensure the embassies’ assistance in labor disputes.300  The integrated 
capacity building and development assistance initiatives under FTAs that raise awareness of labor 
rights are also integral to ASEAN’s legalization of trade-development policy.  These mechanisms 
not only reduce the transaction costs for regional labor utilization, but also strengthen the trade-
development connection in line with the SDGs. 
V. Conclusion 
Trade-development discourse intertwined with North-South conflicts has been at the core of 
multilateral trade negotiations and international economic law.  The SDGs of the 2030 UN Agenda 
for Sustainable Development mandates the revitalization of development in the Doha Round 
negotiations.  Nevertheless, the misconception of SDT has rendered the WTO’s development 
promises unpromising.  The crisis on the disconnection between development goals and the Doha 
Round requires a feasible “Plan B” for the Global South. 
By reassessing the trade-development nexus, this article provided the first analysis of the 
approach to accomplishing the SDGs through regional integration.  It argued that the NREO in the 
multi-polar structure will fortify the coalition of developing countries in expediting the legalization 
of trade-development policy.  The article thus moved the conventional debate to a new dimension 
                                                          
300 See generally Chanda, supra note 149, at 482-192; Labor Migration, Skills & Student Mobility in Asia (2014), at 
43.  This process also helps eliminate undocumented workers. 
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on the assertive role of developing countries and responded to an inquiry of the paradigm shift in 
Asia-Pacific regionalism with interrelated theoretical and substantive claims.  The realist and 
dependency theories explain the geopolitical complexity of the NREO built upon the rapidly 
evolving South-South FTAs.  While realism justifies rare international cooperation in the arenas 
of overlapping national interests, the new dependency theory deciphers the transformation of neo-
colonial economic ties. 
As a timely case study, the research focused on the creation of the ASEAN Economic 
Community and its implications for global trade powers such as the United States, China and Japan.  
It examined the bloc’s incremental process of liberalization and its balance of power strategy to 
alter the hub-and-spoke structure.  The proposed services trade-oriented development policy 
encompasses integral components of intra-regional and extra-regional services commitments and 
transnational schemes on labor mobility.  The post-2015 agenda is advised to center on the 
integration of development assistance and removal of domestic barriers.  Moreover, essential 
actions should include the transnational legal harmonization of mutual recognition and 
immigration rules, as well as linking the FTAs with human rights protection that incorporates 
international labor principles.  These structural movements will provide the best practices for 
global regionalism and reinvigorate the trade-development connection in the multilateral trading 
system. 
